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Evolution Cum Agency: Toward a Model of Strategic Foresight 
 
Abstract: The study examines the origin of the strategic innovation that changed the face of 
financial services—Charles Merrill’s financial supermarket business model—through three 
well-known and largely juxtaposed conceptual models of strategic foresight. Our study, whose 
purpose, business historical focus, and structure mirrors Graham Allison’s famous “Conceptual 
Models of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” allows us to make three contributions. First, it sharpens 
our understanding of the models we used in the study. Second, it provides the foundations of an 
integrated view and model of strategic foresight that suggests disciplined strategic foresight is 
possible, understandable, and replicable within some precise boundaries. Finally, it suggests 
directions for future behavioral strategy work. 
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“Today when we conjure up the names of the 
great American financiers, we tend to think of 
people like J. P. Morgan and Warren Buffett and 
even Michael Milken. But none of them had the 
effect on American life that Charles Merrill had. 
In fact, they’re not even close.” Joseph Nocera, 
Time Magazine, 2009 
 
 
1 Introduction 
The concept of strategic foresight--that is, the ability of a strategist to identify a superior course of 
action, especially one that is markedly different from the status quo, and foresee its consequences--is 
the focal point of a polarized debate in business strategy. Some argue that strategic foresight is simply 
impossible or, at best, heavily constrained; yet others assert that it is not only possible but 
also the learnable skill that defines the role of the strategist. It is therefore natural to ask if these 
opposing viewpoints can be reconciled, or if the clash is unavoidable. In this article we propose an 
answer to this question. We do so by sketching the foundations of a view and a model of strategic 
foresight that has general applicability within some clearly defined boundaries. The position we take 
synthesizes the pessimistic and the optimistic viewpoints on foresight, and perhaps on strategy more 
generally. It synthesizes evolution and agency. This position has implications for future strategy 
research of a behavioral bent.    
Our conception of this study is almost completely indebted to Graham Allison’s “Conceptual 
Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis” (Allison, 1969). But whereas Allison focused on the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, we instead focus on one of the most important strategic innovations in the history of the 
financial services industry: Charles Merrill’s “financial supermarket” business model. Conceived of at 
the end of the thirties, this strategy not only gave impetus to what then became a Wall Street icon, 
Merrill Lynch, but also opened up the then elitist Wall Street to middle-class America. Just as Allison 
looked at the Cuban Missile Crisis through three different models of decision-making, so too do we 
look at the genesis of Merrill Lynch’s strategy through three different models of strategic foresight. 
Polarized debates often focus on demonstrating the superiority of a particular worldview over 
others rather than on progressing understanding. Allison’s approach rejected such antagonistic logic. 
Allison focused on the fact that any conceptual model is a partial representation of a phenomenon, 
centering on certain things while ignoring others. Therefore, any conceptual model (at least those he 
employed in his study) has something valuable to offer, provided that it is understood in ways that 
respect its original character and intent. Multiple lenses, used at once, can produce a fuller 
understanding of a complex phenomenon. It is in this vein that we can understand Allison’s 
aspirations. First, Allison greatly valued clarifying what different models truly can and cannot explain, 
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especially in relation to other relevant models. This was his main goal, and he pursued it first through 
an in-depth appreciation of the conceptual architecture of three models of decision-making and then 
through what this architecture means in practice, i.e., in the explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Second, Allison greatly valued exploring relationships among different conceptual models and the 
possibility of a theoretical integration that goes beyond current explanations. Allison pursued this 
second goal as well. 
Allison’s aspirations define the aspirations and structure of our study. Like Allison, we first 
dissect three well-known conceptual models of strategic foresight. For each model, we lay out its core 
postulates and explanatory mechanisms. We then put the models, as Allison would say, to work. That 
is, we view the focal events through three different points of view. More precisely, for each model we 
ask the following question: given the discovery of the strategy that changed the face of financial 
services, what evidence do we find in the available historical records that is consistent with the 
model’s explanatory engine? The end result should be the unambiguous characterization of the 
models’ practical meaning as well as a richer representation of the focal phenomenon since each 
model illuminates different aspects of it. Finally, we pursue an integrated conceptualization of 
strategic foresight that can somewhat resolve current divisions in the field and offer a richer yet 
behaviorally realistic understanding of strategic foresight. 
 We first consider a viewpoint that is rooted in the Carnegie School, specifically “A Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm” (Cyert and March, 1958), and found a more developed expression in evolutionary 
economics thinking applied to strategy (Nelson and Winter, 1982 and 2000; Levinthal, 1997; Denrell 
et al., 2003; Winter 2012). Here reliably attaining distant strategic foresight is viewed as impossible, 
or at least very unlikely. Given their bounded rationality and the irreducible complexity and instability 
of competitive situations, agents cannot anticipate the consequences of distant courses of action. They 
are inherently myopic (Levinthal and March, 1993). If the management of a firm discovers a 
seemingly distant strategic opportunity, it is not because it has a superior insight or a superior 
representation of the environment; rather, this is due to the fact that the firm is pre-adapted (Cattani 
2006). Indeed, in the pursuit of something other than the opportunity it eventually discovered, the firm 
moved to a position that made the discovery of the opportunity a relatively easy task. The discovery of 
the opportunity is thus serendipitous (Denrell et al., 2003). In caricature you have to be lucky enough 
to stumble upon a well-hidden $10 bill, alert enough to realize that you stumbled on it, and flexible 
enough so that you can bend and pick it up. We call this set of perspectives the “evolutionary view”, 
and focus on “preadaptation” as a specific model of strategic foresight within this view.  
The second viewpoint we consider, also rooted in the Carnegie School, falls within Simon’s 
pragmatist lineage of the school (Simon, 1947; Cohen, 2007). Here, agents cope with their inherent 
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myopia by approaching the strategic problem at hand on the basis of simplified mental representations 
of the problem (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). While in most competitive settings strategic leaders 
share similar mental representations, deviations from a dominant representation can lead one to see 
courses of action that are outside of her peers’ field of vision (Gavetti, 2013). According to this model, 
attaining intelligence in the choice of a new mental representation is possible, for instance, through the 
skilled use of analogy (Gavetti et al., 2005). This is the sense in which this viewpoint differs from the 
evolutionary view, leading us to call it the “cognitive view.” Within this view, we focus on “analogy” 
as a specific model of strategic foresight.  
The third viewpoint is that of the positioning school of strategy (for representative examples: 
Porter, 1980, 1985; Ghemawat, 1991; Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996). In contrast to the other two 
models, this model is not concerned with the rationality with which agents strategize. Instead, it 
assumes that: a) agents reason and conduct analyses by means of economic principles, and b) that they 
are good at doing so once they possess manageable principles. Rationality per se is therefore not 
problematic. What is problematic or relevant is the sophistication of the principles through which the 
strategist approaches the strategic problem. Much of the action in this research tradition therefore lies 
in sharpening the economic principles for thinking about strategy. Here the imagery connected to the 
opportunity discovery process (and the conception of the strategist) is that of an agent who seeks 
strategic insight via economic principles. We call this perspective the “economic view”, and focus on 
“positioning” as a specific model of strategic foresight within this view.   
We then put the models to work. In other words, we use each of the models to interpret in-depth 
historical evidence about how Charles Merrill arrived at his decision. We gathered this evidence via an 
exhaustive analysis of the available historical sources including company documents, Charles 
Merrill’s personal notes, articles, books, a biography of Charles Merrill, and more. The integral 
transcript of the 1940 off-site meeting that spearheaded Merrill & Lynch’s financial supermarket era 
played an especially central role in our historical reconstruction of events1. Notably, one of the reasons 
that makes this historical case particularly interesting is that it is a case of strategic foresight ante 
litteram: it anteceded scholarly attempts specifically directed at explaining and informing the 
discovery of strategic opportunities. If there are typical, systematic factors that underpin strategic 
foresight, we expect some combination of them to be more likely represented in a case of this sort (as 
opposed to a situation that has been “polluted” by recipes focusing the strategist’s attention on some 
mechanisms over others).  
In the final section we bring the three narrative together and use them to sketch the foundations of 
an integrated model of disciplined strategic foresight, one that suggests disciplined strategic foresight 																																																								1	We thank Edwin Perkins for sharing with us this document, which is currently not publicly available  
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is possible, understandable, and replicable within some precise boundaries. The model is profoundly 
evolutionary in its emphasis on the constraining role of history, especially the role of strategists’ 
idiosyncratic experiences in a given set of relevant domains; it is profoundly cognitive in its emphasis 
on cognitive representation and analogical reasoning; and it is profoundly economic in its emphasis on 
the role of economic first principles.  
 
2 Conceptual Models of Strategic Foresight 
We introduce each model by first briefly discussing their general premises and the intellectual milieu 
in which they were conceived, the respective “viewpoint”. Within each viewpoint, we then describe a 
focal model of strategic foresight. Finally, we articulate the central postulates (explicit and implicit 
assumptions) that each model hinges upon. This last step aims to capture in a parsimonious way the 
differences among the models. As Allison pointed out, articulating and simplifying “…a largely 
implicit framework is of necessity to caricature. But caricature can be instructive” (Allison, 1969: 
693). We strive for caricatures that are both accurate and instructive. 
 
2.1 Definitions 
Before proceeding to the models, we define a few concepts that will be used in all of them.  
Strategic Opportunity:  By strategic opportunity we mean a course of action that supports positive 
NPV. By course of action we mean a combination of many components such as commodities, 
resources, or activities, which can be more or less interdependent.  
Complexity: Given a mapping between all conceivable courses of action and payoff, by complexity 
we mean the measure of interdependence among the course of action’s components. In turn, assuming 
that each component of a given course of action contributes to the course of action’s performance, 
interdependence among components means that the contribution of a given component to overall 
performance hinges on the specific nature of the other components2.  
Bounded Rationality: Following Simon (1947 and 1969), by bounded rationality we mean limitations 
in knowledge of the alternatives that are open to choice, and/or limitations in knowledge of the 
consequences that follow on each of the alternatives. In turn, these limitations can be a function of 
lack of information and/or limited computational abilities.  
Cognitive Representation: By cognitive representation of a given reality we mean a simplified 
understanding (or mental image) of said reality. In our context, a cognitive representation of the 
strategic problem means a simplified mental mapping between all conceivable courses of action and 																																																								
2 For instance, if TV advertising, the nature of the product or service produced, and the target market are interdependent, it 
means that the marginal contribution of TV advertising to overall performance hinges upon what specific product or service 
is produced, and what specific market is being targeted. 
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their payoffs. “Simplified” means that an agent holding a cognitive representation of the strategic 
problem “views” only a tiny fraction of all possible courses of action, and views them in coarse terms 
(i.e., the key defining traits of said courses of action).  
 
2.2 The Evolutionary View 
Background 
Half a century ago, Cyert and March wrote a book “about the business firm and the way it makes 
decisions” (Cyert and March, 1963:1) that viewed its theoretical premises as “A set of more frontal 
attacks on the assumptions [of the standard economic theory of the firm]” (Cyert and March, 1963:8). 
The path-breaking nature of this book found one of its most subversive manifestations in the 
assumption that managers “avoid the requirement that they correctly anticipate events in the distant 
future by using decision rules emphasizing short-run reactions to short-run feedback rather than 
anticipation of long-run uncertain events. They solve pressing problems rather than develop long-run 
strategies... In short they achieve a reasonably manageable decision situation by avoiding planning 
where plans depend on predictions of uncertain future events...” (Cyert and March,1963:167).  
Three decades ago, this skepticism about the possibility of intelligent anticipation found new 
interpreters in Nelson and Winter. For Nelson and Winter (1982:134), “As a first approximation, 
therefore, firms can be expected to behave in the future according to the routines they employed in the 
past,” because “Learning guided by short-term feedback can be remarkably powerful, even in 
addressing complex challenges. But that sort of learning does little to enable sophisticated foresight, 
logically structured deliberation and/or the improvisation of novel action patterns—and situations 
that demand these are rarely handled well” (Nelson and Winter, 2002:29).      
Stated differently: a) The anticipation of future events in uncertain worlds outstrips the bounds of 
managers’ rationality; b) Managers deal with this challenge by avoiding anticipation altogether; c) 
Managers resort to reliable coping mechanisms like short-term reaction to short-term feedback, 
routines, and the establishment of aspiration levels that trigger search when performance falls below 
such levels. The image is that of cognitively bounded agents who can see only a short distance from 
their current position, who are mostly coasting along on their existing routines, and where change 
happens in response to unsatisfactory outcomes through local modifications of the status quo, with the 
environment then selecting performance-improving adaptations. Path dependence in capabilities 
development is a fundamental consequence of individual and organizational myopia. 
The evolutionary sensibility of these pioneering contributions has had great influence on work on 
organizations and strategy, from work on organizational learning (Levitt and March, 1988; Levinthal 
and March, 1993; Cohen and Sproull, 1996; March et al., 1996; Argote, 1999), to work on 
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organizational knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992), to the so-called “capabilities” paradigm of 
strategy research (Teece et al., 1997; Dosi et al., 2000), which came to be a dominant voice in the 
current strategy debate (for a review, see Gavetti and Levinthal, 2004).  
 
Model of Foresight: Preadaptation and Local Search 
It should not come as a surprise that this perspective, which assumes sharp constraints to anticipation, 
does not pay much attention to foresight. Work in this tradition has taken the aforementioned 
assumptions for granted and mostly ignored the foresight problem while celebrating substitute sources 
of organizational intelligence. But there are exceptions, most notably the line of work of Sidney 
Winter and colleagues on strategy and strategic opportunities (cfr. especially Winter, 1987; Nelson 
and Winter, 2002; Denrell et al., 2003 (DFW from now on); Winter, 2012). Because this stream of 
work is almost unique in this tradition in its direct tackling of foresight, it is on its basis, especially 
DFW, and Cattani’s related work on pre-adaptation (Cattani 2006), that we lay out the focal model for 
the evolutionary view. DFW is particularly revealing of the school’s position on foresight, or lack 
thereof, because it focuses squarely on our focal question: given that a firm has discovered a strategic 
opportunity, what process is likely to have led to it?  
Here is the gist of their answer: “We argue that…[the discovery of a strategic opportunity] is 
likely to have been serendipitous… The firm that did spot the opportunity must, for some reason, 
already have been in possession of several of the necessary components. The reason is the same as 
emphasized by Simon in his discussion of the evolution of complexity (Simon, 1962; 1969). A complex 
system is unlikely to emerge if it requires that numerous elements are simultaneously combined. It is 
much more likely to emerge if it can be assembled via existing subsystems. In this case, the evolution 
of the system does not hinge upon the chance event that all necessary components emerged 
simultaneously in the right combination. Applied to the context of opportunity recognition, Simon’s 
argument suggests that it is much more likely that an opportunity that requires a complex combination 
of commodities would be discovered if it could be assembled using subsystems that were already 
available since they were considered valuable by themselves” (DFW: 986). Further, “it is more likely 
in proportion as more of those subsystems are known to a single firm” (DFW: 986), because if several 
firms had this knowledge, the strategic opportunity could be quickly contested.  
Foresight then, especially distant foresight (i.e., the ability to anticipate courses of action that are 
distant from the status quo and whose consequences depend on distant environments) does not play a 
primary role in the evolutionary story. Much of the action lies in the unintentional (for the purposes of 
the opportunity discovery) acquisition or development of most of the subsystems that are required to 
seize the opportunity: in order to recognize the opportunity, the firm must be almost there. Critical to 
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this account is therefore the idiosyncratic history of the focal firm, which makes its management team 
uniquely able to see what other firms’ management teams cannot see. To the extent that foresight 
enters the equation, it does so once the opportunity has been identified, and it involves the recognition 
of the incremental additional steps (i.e., missing subsystems) that need to be taken in order to pursue 
the opportunity. In metaphor, the process of opportunity recognition is “analogous to an individual 
facing a jigsaw puzzle with only a few lacking pieces. Even if the individual did not have any idea of 
the final picture, and thus initially could not be guided by any picture of the final outcome, when most 
pieces were assembled he or she would nevertheless be able to guess the final picture and thus the 
color and pattern of the final pieces. In a similar way, when a firm has assembled many of the 
necessary components, it may be able to see that these resources could be valuable if complemented 
with some others. As a result, the search for the last components will be intentional rather than 
serendipitous.” (DFW:987). 
Stated differently, the firm must be pre-adapted (Cattani, 2006), like what happens in nature when 
“by chance, an organ that works well in one function turns out to work well in another function after 
relatively little adjustment” (Ridley, 1999:347). For instance, in the context of technological evolution, 
Cattani (2006) shows that Corning pioneered fiber optics (Corning’s core business for many years) not 
because it had superior foresight of this technology’s potential. Rather, when the market hinted at 
possible telecommunications applications of fiber optics, Corning happened to possess a series of fiber 
optics technologies that it had developed for other purposes that made it easy for Corning to see the 
opportunity, i.e., fiber optics’ revolutionary telecommunication potential. Corning had the right 
technological subsystems in place at the right time: it was in the proximity of an opportunity when the 
all the conditions were in place for the opportunity to materialize.  
 
Postulates 
The evolutionary model hinges on the following distinctive (implicit or explicit) assumptions:  
 
P0PR3. Agents are boundedly rational and therefore sharply limited in their ability to foresee complex 
strategic opportunities. 
P1PR. Agents cannot reliably develop cognitive representations that can serve as a basis for distant 
foresight. 
P2PR. Generic representations that capture fundamental truths about the world (like those stemming 
from the application of economic principles to real-life situations) are broadly available, but unlikely 																																																								
3 The suffix PR stands for “preadaptation.” Similarly, below we use the suffix A to denote “analogy” postulates, and PO to 
denote “positioning” postulates.  
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to offer truly superior insight. 
P3PR. Agents might be able to spot an arbitrage opportunity, but only if it involves an incremental 
change in the way certain elements are used.  
P4PR. In the hypothetical event that an agent attains distant foresight4 for whatever reason, the future 
behavior of the organization would be strongly conditioned by its past experience, as recorded or 
reflected in its learned routines and capabilities, and also in its assets (“resources”), culture and 
reputations with diverse audiences.5 
 
A brief elaboration is necessary. Relative to P1PR, P2PR, and P3PR, the claim that generic 
representations exist that are designed to help agents make sense of their strategic problems is 
uncontroversial (see the positioning model below). Uncontroversial is also the claim that agents 
routinely use cognitive representations, whether generic or idiosyncratic, to help them understand, 
manage, and solve strategic problems. Yet, central to this model is the proposition that an opportunity 
can be spotted only if the firm has most of the subsystems in place, when it is “almost there.” This 
proposition therefore rejects the notion that superior insight can be had via generic representations, the 
reason being that something generic, and therefore held by most managers, can lead at best to spotting 
short-lived opportunities. It also rejects the possibility that agents can reliably acquire or develop 
idiosyncratic superior representations of their strategic problems. “Reliably” here indicates the 
possibility that something like a method can be devised that helps agents use their idiosyncratic 
experience or information toward the accurate representation of the focal situation (i.e., one that 
captures, for instance, the causal structure that underlies observed outcomes). The negation of 
reliability in the acquisition of accurate representations of the strategic problem is equivalent to 
negating the possibility of intelligent anticipation or foresight, especially if distant. It is largely 
because of this overall skepticism toward the role of representations that “There may be little to learn 
from examining the strategy process of successful firms” (DFW: 987).  
P4PR is a variation of what Nelson and Winter (2002) call “the behavioral continuity” assumption. 
As Winter (private communication) put it: “Predictions about future behavior should privilege 
information about a firm’s heritage over relatively abstract impressions of objectives, declaratory 
“strategies” and instrumentalities that are available in principle but perhaps not in practice (such as 
“simply” purchasing a needed capability or reputation.)” This proposition offers a second, related 
rationale for the pre-adaptation model. Even if P1PR, P2PR, and P3PR were violated, and a firm foresaw 
a superior course of action that involves substantial change and depend on a remote environment, the 																																																								
4 In the form, for instance, of a representation allowing the identification of the broad traits of a superior course of action.   
5 P4PR did not exist in the first version of the paper. We thank Sidney Winter for highlighting the need for it.  
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journey to success should be expected to be hard and ultimately unlikely to reach the hoped-for 
destination. 
Corollary: Heterogeneity: Since agents cannot reliably generate or choose cognitively distant 
representations that lead to strategic foresight, any heterogeneity that is observed among agents in 
their ability to seize a strategic opportunity has to be traced back to luck that caused them to become 
“pre-adapted” for a certain opportunity, alertness that allows them to see the opportunity when it is 
close enough (that is, they could have still used a cognitive representation to evaluate the course of 
action, but since it was “close enough” to the status quo, the status quo representation was sufficient to 
allow the agent to evaluate the potential performance implication of the action with small, incremental 
changes), and flexibility that allows them to seize the opportunity. 	
3.3 The Cognitive View 
Background 
Cyert and March drew on “Administrative Behavior” in their emphasis on behavioral realism, but their 
goals could not be more different from Simon’s. Simon was a pragmatist at heart (Cohen, 2007). 
Where Cyert and March were interested in sheer realistic “representation” of the way decisions happen 
in “the modern representative firm” (Cyert and March, 1963:1), Simon was interested in realism 
insofar as its pursuit could help augment the intelligence of decisions in organizations. And this 
position goes back to his dissertation (then Administrative Behavior) days: “It is the thesis of this study 
that the construction of a satisfactory administrative theory waits upon the solution to this final 
question (What administrative arrangements are conducive to “correct” choices?)” (Simon, 1943:2).6  
This distinction is of central importance here because Simon’s pragmatic sensibility led to a view of 
foresight that differs substantially from the evolutionary view. In the latter, the avoidance of 
anticipation must be the view’s pillar insofar as that is how the representative firm normally copes 
with its rationality bounds. It is a central tendency in how organizations approach decisions. Indeed, 
for Cyert and March (1963: 121) “Rather than looking for ways of dealing with uncertainty through 
certainty equivalents, the firm looks for procedures that minimize the need for predicting uncertain 																																																								
6 Because his ultimate goal was not to characterize the representative firm, Simon did not build his theoretical engine around 
it. Cyert and March wanted to “Link models of the firm as closely as possible to empirical observations of both the decision 
output and the process structure of actual business organizations” (Cyert and March, 1963:2). In contrast, presumably due to 
his pragmatic preoccupation that attending to too many layers of organizational complexity makes it too hard to attain 
practical relevance, for Simon “...The scantiness of my experiences with organizations posed no particular limit to my 
development of an alternative approach to decision making. Applying the ideas of bounded rationality to organizations could 
then be easily achieved with only a bookish knowledge of organizations. It was simply necessary to ask what the implications 
of bounded rationality were for the division of labor, for authority, for organizational identification, for coordination, and so 
on. Inference rather than empirical observation could, and did, guide this analysis” Simon (1991:87). Simon’s starting point 
for Administrative Behavior was the idea of bounded rationality and the evidence supporting it, not evidence of decision-
making in the representative firm. 
	 12	
future events. One method uses short-run feedback as a trigger to action, another accepts (and 
enforces) standardized decision rules.” Simon’s point of departure is radically different: it is not how 
economic agents normally cope with the bounds of rationality, but how to augment rationality; it is not 
how to substitute the hard-to-attain anticipatory logic, but pushing our limits in attaining it. Thus, even 
if anticipation of “the consequences that will follow on each choice” (Simon, 1947:81) is sharply 
limited, and “In actual behavior only a very few of these possible alternatives ever come to mind,” 
(Simon, 1947:81), agents can still somewhat anticipate choice alternatives and their consequences by 
forming mental images of future situations and their relative merits—cognitive representations. 
Indeed, “Since these consequences lie in the future, imagination must supply the lack of experienced 
feeling in attaching value to them,” (Simon, 1947:81) where imagination stands for mental 
representation. From this standpoint, therefore, the natural starting point of a model of foresight is the 
construct of cognitive representation, especially the question of whether and how the acquisition of 
appropriate cognitive representations of complex problems can occur. This position draws a profound 
dividing line between this cognitive perspective and the evolutionary view.7 
Since the fifties, the concept of cognitive representation has been the leitmotiv of the “cognitive 
revolution,” of which Simon was a main figure (Thagard, 2014). Indeed, the focal question of the 
intelligent acquisition of representations has been on cognitive scientists’ radar screen for a long time 
(cfr. Simon, 1969). Yet, because of its difficulty, progress on it has proceeded slowly (Kaplan and 
Simon, 1990). A notable exception has been the study of analogy and related associative forms of 
reasoning (Gentner, 1983; Holyoak and Thagard, 1995; Hofstadter, 2001). According to analogy 
scholars, analogy is not only an ubiquitous source of representation or interpretation (Gentner, 1983), 
but also something that can be disciplined to a substantive degree.8 The potential power and ubiquity 
of this kind of reasoning is such that it has recently become the focus of theories of decisions that 
emphasize behaviorally realistic accounts of decision-making in complex and uncertain worlds, 
whether in administrative disciplines (March, 2006; Gavetti et al. 2005; Loewenstein et al., 2003), 
decision theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 2001), economics (Mullainathan et al, 2008), or political 
science (Neustadt and May, 1986).  Because this body of work offers a simple characterization of a 
(potentially) powerful and common source of representation, an understanding of what distinguishes 
good from bad analogizing, and anecdotal evidence that strategists often reason analogically, we take 
analogy as the focal model of the cognitive view. This is not to say, of course, that the intelligent 																																																								
7 The irony in all this is that Simon’s early work was heavily influenced by behaviorism, the then dominant school of thought 
in psychology. Interestingly though, Simon’s main influence was not mainstream behaviorist work, but Edward C. Tolman, 
one of behaviorism’s most unorthodox voices. Tolman was the first to introduce the concept of mental map, precursor of 
cognitive representation, in his 1948 article “Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men” (Tolman, 1948).  
8  That analogy is a very important form of thinking is not a new insight. For instance, Hume (1748) concluded: “From causes 
which appear similar we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions.” 
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acquisition of cognitive representations cannot be arrived at through different mechanisms, which can 
be more or less associative in nature (Edelman, 1987, Holyoak and Cheng, 2011). For instance, recent 
work demonstrates the possibility of acquiring and refining representations of strategic problems 
through a process that is more reminiscent of local hill search over the space of representations than it 
is of analogy (Csaszar and Levinthal, 2015). There can thus be other legitimate interpretations of the 
cognitive model that future work can explore to expand our analogy-based interpretation of the 
cognitive model.  
 
Model of Foresight: Analogy 
Although our model seeks to capture the substance and spirit of the aforementioned work on analogy 
more generally, its language and emphasis is more aligned with work that has focused on analogy 
specifically in decision making and strategy settings, especially Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) and 
Gavetti et al. (2005).  
In its simplest form the structure of analogy can be defined along the following coordinates. 
 
A) Agents face a problem, so-called “target” problem TP.  
B) Agents have a finite memory M comprising direct and vicarious experiences, and organized in 
terms of “cases” – episodes, or classes of episodes (i.e., categories), C1...CN.  
C) Formally, a case Ci is a triplet (P, A, O), where P is a problem (also called “source” problem), A is 
an action (the solution to the problem), and O is an outcome. That is, agents hold memories of 
problems they directly or indirectly experienced, solutions to these problems, and outcomes associated 
to these solutions.  
D) Analogical reasoning occurs when the solution A’ to TP is found via perceived similarity between 
TP and a problem P encountered in the past. More precisely, A’ is an adaptation of A, the solution that 
led to a satisfactory outcome O to problem P.  
 
If these four coordinates provide the essential anatomy of analogical reasoning, the actual process 
can vary along at least three dimensions. 
First, there is the question of how broadly individuals search their memory when facing a problem. 
Here we do not refer to the micro neuro-cognitive mechanisms of search (although this is an active 
area of research, see Anderson and Bower, 1980; Kandel et al., 2000) but to how extensively 
individuals search cases in their memory when facing a problem. At one extreme, there is an 
exhaustive search over all possible memories. Although this process is cognitively implausible, 
analogy-based decision-theoretic models have moved in this direction (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 2001). 
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At the other extreme, one can imagine the absence of search. That is, in a particular problem domain 
the focal agent might have one particularly salient memory through which she tends to analogize when 
problems arise in that domain.  
Second, there is the question of the extent to which the solution A gets adapted to reflect the 
peculiarities of the target problem. Here, at one extreme there is the complete replica of A, and at the 
other extreme solutions that are used just as a coarse starting point for a process of adaptation to the 
idiosyncratic circumstances of the target problem. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, there is the question of how deep the focal agent draws 
similarities between the source problem and the target problem TP. This is thought to be the critical 
driver of the quality of analogical reasoning. Gentner (1983) for instance draws a sharp distinction 
between similarity premised on superficial features of the source problem (i.e., features that 
characterize the source problem but are not part of what makes a particular solution work), and 
similarity premised on the deep structure of the source problem (i.e., the reasons why a given solution 
worked well or badly in the source). More specifically, deep analogy requires an accurate causal 
understanding of the source: why solution A works well in problem P. This requirement in turn 
requires isolating the central elements of A, how they relate to each other, and what contextual 
conditions of P (i.e., deep features of the problem) need to be met for that particular solution to work 
well in P. According to Gentner, it is the latter type of analogy, also called deep or structural analogy, 
which is particularly likely to provide valuable solutions to the problem at hand. Gavetti et al., (2005) 
proposed a business strategy interpretation of this principle. They note that any business or industry 
can be characterized in terms of a variety of “observable characteristics”—features that managers can 
observe and assess. Many of these characteristics are superficial in the sense that their presence or 
absence does not affect the mapping between possible courses of action and economic performance. 
Conversely, some of these characteristics are consequential vis-a-vis economic performance: for 
instance whether economies of scale are present or absent in a given business typically has 
implications for what course of action is eventually successful. Obviously, in order for analogy to be a 
useful guide to choice, the assessment of similarity should proceed on the basis of deep features of the 
industry. For the purposes of the current study it suffices to know that there can be great variation 
among specific individuals and instances of analogical reasoning in terms of the extensiveness of 
search, the degree of adaptation of the solution, and the depth of similarity mapping. 
 
Postulates 
The analogical model of the cognitive view hinges on the following distinctive (implicit or explicit) 
assumptions: 
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P0A. Agents are boundedly rational and therefore sharply limited in their ability to foresee complex 
strategic opportunities. 
P1A. Agents can reliably develop cognitive representations that can serve as a basis for distant 
foresight. 
P2A. A possible mechanism for reliably developing such representations is analogy. 
P2.1A: In familiar contexts or competitive settings, the causal structure of the relationship 
between a given strategic course of action and its payoff (i.e., what conditions of context P 
need to be satisfied so that course of action A leads to outcome O) can be discerned in its 
fundamental elements. 
Def.: Deeply similar cases are those that share a similar causal structure (e.g., the conditions 
that need to be met in order for A to lead to O) 
P2.2A: In deeply similar problems, similar courses of action lead to similar outcomes.9  
 
Corollary: Heterogeneity: The logical implication of the above postulates, especially P2A, P2.1A, and 
P2.2A, is that heterogeneity among agents in their ability to achieve strategic foresight via analogy is a 
function of three variables: a) The existence in agents’ memory of direct and indirect experiences of a 
case that is structurally similar to the problem at hand; b) Agents’ ability to search, retrieve and adapt 
such a case; c) Agents’ ability to assess similarity in the problems’ deep features. 
 
3.4 The Economic View 
Background 
The evolutionary and the cognitive views are different expressions of a scholarly tradition that 
originated, as Cyert and March put it, as a “frontal attack” to the “standard economic theory of the 
firm.” This same economic theory is the ground in which the economic view, as we conceive of it 
here, originated. The story is well known (Ghemawat, 2002). In a nutshell, by the early seventies clear 
evidence had accumulated in Industrial Organization economics that the structure of many industries 
might permit incumbents to gain superior returns for long periods of time. Hundreds of empirical 
studies had been published that explored, in different industries, the specific industry characteristics 																																																								
9 This postulate finds a deep analogue in Hume’s famous “An enquiry concerning human understanding.” In particular: “In 
reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural objects, and by which 
we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from such objects. And though none but a fool 
or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life, it may surely 
be allowed a philosopher to have so much curiosity at least as to examine the principle of human nature, which gives this 
mighty authority to experience, and makes us draw advantage from that similarity which nature has placed among different 
objects. From causes which appear similar we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions.” 
(Hume 1748, Section IV) 
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leading to superior profitability. From a public policy perspective, the objective was the minimization 
of excessive profits. It was in this intellectual milieu that in 1975 Michael Porter wrote a “Note on the 
Structural Analysis of Industries,” which reversed this logic by focusing on the business policy 
objective of profit maximization. This note marked the beginning of a school of thought (also called 
“positioning school”) that greatly influenced both the practice (e.g., Porter, 1980 and 1996), and the 
theory of strategy (e.g., Ghemawat, 1991; Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996).  
What interests us is the model of strategic foresight underlying the conception of the “strategist” 
that this line of work puts forth. If the starting point of the evolutionary and cognitive views are 
constraints that, as Simon (1972) would put it, are internal to the individual, here the key constraints, 
the problematic areas, are external to the individual. If the evolutionary and cognitive views use a 
magnifying lens to see how the individual processes information and how she can get better at that, the 
economic view uses a magnifying lens to explore the regularities of the working of competitive 
processes. Therefore, scholarly progress here largely accrues as a result of a better understanding of 
the competitive game (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996 and 2007). What does this all mean for the 
question at hand? The first thing to consider is that in the positioning perspective the agents that 
populate the theory have traditionally been viewed as unproblematic rational profit maximizers. As a 
result, the strategist does not enter the theoretical picture. She is left in the background, behind the 
scenes. But if this is true relative to the protagonists of the theoretical fiction, it is also true that the 
positioning paradigm, with its prescriptive emphasis, rests on the implicit assumption that an 
individual exists that can apply the right principles to good effect, and the question of strategic 
opportunity discovery needs to be understood in terms of the implicit assumptions that are made on 
this user of the theory. We will elaborate on these assumptions as postulates below. To preview, it is 
important to keep in mind that the proposition: “In essence, the job of the strategist is to understand 
and cope with competition” (Porter, 2008) hides a series of implicit assumptions about the strategist 
that are more aligned with the “bounded rationality” movement than has typically been recognized. If 
the basic idea is that a strategist that fulfills her role can bring her firm to enjoy sustained superior 
returns, and her job is to “understand and cope” with competitive forces, then it must be true that 
agents’ baseline ability to “understand and cope” with competition is far from the full rationality 
ideal, or “superior” would turn into “normal.” Stated differently, the economic theories that are the 
foundation of this work act as first principles (or meta-representations) to help boundedly rational 
actors form powerful representations of their competitive landscape. Viewed in this light, the 
economic and the cognitive views are similar despite their differing roots (Levinthal, 2011).  
 
Model of Foresight: Positioning 
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The economic view is straightforward in its characterization of foresight.  The acquisition of proper 
economic principles is a “foundation for the formulation of business strategies” (Brandenburger and 
Stuart, 1996: 5). That is, such principles give strategists the possibility of forming meaningful 
representations of the competitive landscape--simplified mental pictures of some select broad courses 
of actions and their relative payoffs. The job of the strategist is to then find the best “position” on this 
competitive landscape. Stated differently, strategic foresight is premised on learnable first economic 
principles.  
 
Core Postulates 
The key traits of the positioning model of foresight correspond to largely unstated assumptions that 
can be inferred from the general logic of the positioning argument. We think these assumptions hold 
more or less true across a wide spectrum of contributions in this school, both positive and normative 
ones. 
 
P0PO. Agents are boundedly rational and therefore sharply limited in their ability to foresee complex 
strategic opportunities. 
P1PO. Agents can reliably develop cognitive representations that can serve as a basis for distant 
foresight. 
P2PO. A possible mechanism for developing such representations is the application of economic 
principles (or frameworks embodying such principles) to the strategic situation at hand.  
P2.1PO. The power of these principles derives from their being drawn from solid empirical 
regularities. 
P2.2PO. The quality of the strategy formulation process (i.e., the quality of foresight) is a function 
of the agent’s familiarity with the relevant principles and her ability in applying them to the 
strategic problem. 
 
Corollary: Heterogeneity: Heterogeneity in the ability of agents to achieve strategic foresight is 
due to the heterogeneity in the agents’ familiarity with the relevant economic principles and her ability 
in applying them to the strategic problem. 
 
3. Data and Methodological Considerations 
Before we proceed to the narratives, we would like to provide some detail regarding the historical 
material relating to the Charles Merrill episode. 
We sought to be as exhaustive as possible in identifying useful historical material on Charles 
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Merrill and Merrill Lynch. In addition to a very informative biography of Charles Merrill (Perkins, 
1999) as well as a highly detailed history of Merrill Lynch (Smith, 2013)10, we reviewed firm 
documents such as the detailed transcript of the 1940 “strategy off-site” meeting that kicked off the 
new strategy at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in Manhattan, annual reports, and other internal 
communications that we were able to gather. We also reviewed newspaper or magazine articles that 
focused on Charles Merrill’s activities, Merrill Lynch, Safeway, and Pierce & Co. during the 1920-
1940 period. Finally, we reviewed historical studies on Wall Street and the financial sector more 
generally, as well as contemporary newspaper or magazine articles focused on the industry. We 
reviewed and interpreted all of this material independently of each other before sharing and discussing 
our interpretations.  
The complete transcript of the 1940 meeting was especially relevant to our reconstruction of the 
events. It is an extraordinary document because in the context of that meeting, Merrill laid out his 
strategic ideas and how he arrived at them in excruciating detail. The meeting unfolded over a two-day 
period, and brought together Merrill Lynch’s executive partner Charles Merrill, other top executives 
(most notably Winthrop H. Smith, the man who more than anyone else was instrumental to Merrill’s 
return to Wall Street, and Edward A. Pierce, former managing partner of Pierce & Co.), and around 70 
brokers. A special guest was Ted Braun of Braun & Co., an independent LA-based consulting firm. 
Merrill had met Ted Braun in the context of some work Braun did for Safeway, and the two men had 
become friends. Before accepting Pierce & Co.’s offer, Merrill commissioned Ted Braun (who, as 
Perkins remarks, was a pioneer in the use of modern polling techniques) to undertake a thorough 
survey of a sample of Pierce & Co.’s 3000 customers and a sample of potential customers, and an in-
depth analysis of the operations of the Pierce branch in Los Angeles. As will become clear later in the 
narratives, Braun’s study played an important part in Merrill’s decision to accept the challenge and re-
enter the financial world, as well as in Merrill’s conceptualization of Merrill Lynch’s strategy, and 
Braun was given ample room at the meeting to present the results of his study.  
At this point, we note that these documents are all historical artifacts, and that they cannot be 
taken at face value. There is a “data generating process” that produced them, and a sequence of events 
that caused the object to survive and come to our attention. Furthermore, there are also questions 
concerning the “nature” of the object, particularly the transcript of the 1940 meeting, which may be 
colored by Merrill’s need to persuade a group of potentially skeptical, resistant employees to believe 
in the new vision. As will become evident below, there are good reasons to believe the document is a 																																																								
10 Interestingly, this book was written by Winthrop H. Smith Jr., the son of Winthrop H. Smith who played a very important 
role in Merrill’s return to Wall Street, as we will see in the next section. This personal connection allowed the author access 
to many private documents and letters as well as personal quotes, and this significantly enriched our understanding of the 
story. We thank Sidney Winter for pointing us to this source, which (according to him) he discovered “serendipitously.” 
	 19	
fundamentally faithful representation of Merrill’s thinking. But it is important to at least flag this 
potential issue. Thus, a lot of care needs to be taken when using such evidence. But at the same time, 
given its uniquely valuable nature, it should not be ignored either. Thus, we have attempted to 
triangulate around the facts with the larger set of documents mentioned earlier.11 
 
4 Narratives 
4.0 Background 
On April 3, 1940, at the Starlight Ballroom of the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City, Charles 
E. Merrill of Merrill Lynch, E.A. Pierce & Cassatt (Merrill Lynch from now on)12 unveiled the 
strategic innovation that changed the face of Wall Street.  
In 1940, Charles E. Merrill was a semi-retired 54 year old businessman. Born in Florida from a 
middle-class family, and educated at Amherst College and the University of Michigan, he found his 
way to the then elitist Wall Street, where he made himself wealthy thanks to Merrill, Lynch & Co., the 
underwriting/merchant banking house he founded in 191413. By the end of the twenties, Merrill, Lynch 
& Co. was a healthy company, known in Wall Street especially for its merchant banking successes. 
Merrill was one of the few bankers to anticipate the big crash of 1929. In fact, Merrill, Lynch & Co. 
liquidated most of its assets in early 1929, and remained largely unscathed by the crash. In the thirties 
Charles Merrill left Wall Street. Merrill, Lynch & Co. sold its brokerage operations to the brokerage 
house E.A. Pierce & Co., and became a mostly dormant concern, active only in infrequent 
underwriting deals. At the same time, Merrill focused his attention on Safeway Stores, a grocery chain 
based in California, where he had kept a controlling stake from the merchant banking days of the 
previous decade. In addition, he retained a minority interest in E.A. Pierce & Co. In the thirties Merrill 
spent much of his time playing golf and tennis in his Southampton mansion, but also made frequent 
trips to California to oversee the operations of Safeway.  
It was in this context that at the end of 1939, E.A. Pierce & Co. offered Merrill the opportunity to 
go back to financial services. Like many other Wall Street firms hit by the deep crisis of 1938-1943, 
the brokerage house was in trouble, and Merrill was thought of as a white knight who could rescue it. 
The idea was to merge what remained of Merrill, Lynch & Co (the investment banking arm of the old 
firm, which retained a skeleton staff) with E.A. Pierce & Co., and simultaneously merge with Cassatt 
& Co., a Philadelphia-based investment banking and brokerage house with which Pierce & Co. had 																																																								
11 We thank Daniel Raff for emphasizing these methodological issues. 
12 Merrill Lynch, E.A. Pierce and Cassatt was renamed Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane in 1941 after the acquisition 
of Fenner & Beane, and finally Merrill Lynch Co. in 1952. 
13 Charles E. Merrill & Co. was founded on Jan 6, 1914. It was renamed Merrill, Lynch & Co. on Oct 15, 1915 bringing 
Edmund C. Lynch on board. 
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been partnering since 1935. Merrill would assume the title of Merill Lynch’s14 “directing partner” with 
complete decision powers. Despite some initial hesitation, Merrill accepted the job. Just a few months 
later, on April 3, 1940, he unveiled a strategy for the new company that radically departed from 
anything ever seen before in Wall Street or the financial sector more generally. Merrill envisioned a 
“financial supermarket” that, in the elitist Wall Street of that era, would open the financial world to the 
middle class. At that time, it was common belief in Wall Street that middle-class investors were “little 
fellows who had no right to be buying chips” (Fortune, 1941: 103).   
Merrill’s strategic innovation led to one of the most spectacular successes in the history of Wall 
Street, which also marked a dividing line between the old and the modern Wall Street (Sobel, 2000). 
That Merrill’s strategic concept was path-breaking was also evident to his contemporaries. For 
instance, a skeptical 1941 Fortune article concluded that: “...[I]f he succeeds in making a profit, it will 
constitute the greatest possible incentive for other firms to follow similar or better methods. Thus, 
although the firm’s motives are completely narrow and selfish, it does not alter the fact that a success 
would stimulate the financial business as a whole...with a consequent stimulation of the entire 
machinery for a free capital market.” (Fortune, 1941: 120.) 
    We now use our three models of strategic foresight as three interpretive platforms for how 
Charles Merrill, the directing partner and chief strategist of Merrill Lynch, came to his strategic insight 
in 1940. We move sequentially from one model to the next. In each case we look for historical 
evidence that corroborates the model.  
 
4.1 Evolutionary View: Preadaptation 
We put the preadaptation model to work with two overarching questions in mind. The first question is: 
what are the precise components (i.e., activities, resources, subsystems, capabilities) of the strategy 
Charles Merrill had in mind when he articulated the strategic future of Merrill Lynch in 1940, and 
which of these components were already in place at that time? This question captures what we view as 
the necessary condition of an evolutionary narrative: the existence at time T, when a given strategic 
opportunity is conceptualized in the mind of the strategist, of most of the subsystems or activities said 
strategic opportunity is to be comprised of at time T+1. Indeed, as we saw, the situation should be 
“analogous to an individual facing a jigsaw puzzle with only a few lacking pieces” (DFW: 986). It is 
only when a few lacking pieces are missing that the strategist “would...be able to guess the final 
picture and thus the color and pattern of the final pieces. In a similar way, when a firm has assembled 
many of the necessary components, it may be able to see that these resources could be valuable if 																																																								
14 Despite the death of his long-time partner and friend Edmund C. Lynch in 1938, Charles insisted on keeping “Lynch” in 
the title of the new company 
	 21	
complemented with some others” (DFW; 986). The second question is: how did these preexisting 
components help spark the insight that led to the new strategic conceptualization? 
A practical way to answer the first question is to do something in the spirit of Siggelkow’s (2002) 
study of Vanguard, or Gavetti and Rivkin’s (2005) study of Lycos. These studies documented, 
respectively, Vanguard’s and Lycos’ strategic histories. To aid the analysis, they created maps of the 
most salient elements of the companies’ strategy at select points in time. Similarly, we create a map of 
the most salient elements of Merrill Lynch’s strategy as Merrill envisioned them in 1940. We then 
contrast this map with a map of the actual strategy in place at that time. According to the behavioral 
narrative, there should be significant overlap between the two maps. We inferred the map of Charles 
Merrill’s strategic idea from the transcript of the 1940 Waldorf Astoria meeting. More specifically, the 
map is comprised of policy choices that were explicitly articulated in the Waldorf Astoria Meeting 
transcript (WAMT from now on), and that we encoded as being particularly salient to Merrill’s 
narrative. We triangulated this evidence with other archival sources.  
 
Merrill’s idea in 1940. 
Figure 1 represents Merrill’s initial strategic conceptualization of Merrill Lynch’s strategy, organized 
in terms of broad/core policies (the round gray nodes) and narrowly defined ones (the square white 
notes), connected through lines representing logical interdependencies among them as we could infer 
them from WAMT. Merrill’s strategic design was straightforward. Its heart is what Merrill referred to 
as his “theory of merchandising,” which Merrill described in terms of six overarching policies: a) 
attracting the middle class; b) commitment to the chain store format; c) delivering the best product in 
town; d) doing so at the lowest possible price in town (in the class of products and services delivered); 
e) a culture of unconditional respect and commitment toward all customers, small and large, no matter 
their importance; f) a culture of parsimony and frugality. In Merrill’s words, “I hope you will bear 
with me on this thing, because I consider it absolutely basic if you are going to understand my theory 
of merchandising. When a customer comes into the Safeway Store, to be specific, she is entitled to buy 
the best merchandise in the market that she can find any place in that city, and she is entitled to buy 
with confidence that she is getting full value at the lowest possible price that can be found in any store 
in that town. And the difference between what she pays, item by item, and our cost, by George, is our 
gross profit, and not some per cent. Most merchants say that they are competitive, that their prices are 
fair, provided they think they are striking an arithmetical average. That hasn’t got a damned thing to 
do with our theory of merchandising.” (WAMT: 7-8). Further, “Now, in our business and in every 
business that deals with the public, there are two types of customers: the smart customer who knows 
his or her way around, and the rank and file of customers who think that you are just absolutely all 
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right and leaves it to you to charge a fair fee for your services. Now, I contend that, win, lose, or 
draw, we must treat all customers the same[…] When we open our doors to all class of customers, we 
have simply got to nail the policy to the mast that anybody that comes in this shop is going to receive 
the squarest and best treatment on the lowest competitive terms” (WAMT: 9). All in all, the theory 
was that the rising middle class was where the opportunity existed, and that low price but high-quality 
service to all types of customers--small and large, poor and rich--was the path to pursue this 
opportunity.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Charles Merrill’s Strategic Representation in April 1940 
 
The initial articulation of Merrill’s theory of merchandising in the context of financial services 
took the form of three main groups of “policies and practices” (see Figure 1 for a detailed map). In the 
next section we will elaborate on Braun’s contribution to the formulation of these policies. For the 
time being, it suffices to say that Braun provided much of the factual evidence that was needed to 
make these choices.  
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The first group revolves around cost. Here, for Merrill the key policy was scale in the form of a 
very large network of branches. Indeed, such a network affords “the same advantage that a big 
manufacturer has. If Henry Ford’s company made only ten thousand cars a year, the cost of those 
cars would be so great that Henry couldn’t sell one of those ten thousand cars” (WAMT: 83). The 
implication is that a larger network of offices that relies completely on the support of a central office 
affords a stronger central office at a lower price per transaction. In addition, Merrill realized that “If 
R.H. Macy had the same approach toward important expenses, business-getting expenses, that all 
members of the New York Stock Exchange have, I assure you R.H. Macy & Company would be out of 
business by next April first, and it wouldn’t be April Fool’s Day either.” The point was that frugality 
was antithetical to Wall Street’s culture and Pierce & Co. was no exception; and a company aspiring to 
deliver the best service in town at the lowest price, in addition to having large scale, needed to be 
frugal. Therefore, a mindset of frugality was very important to Merrill’s strategic design, together with 
a series of related low-cost policies such as: relocating to small and modest offices (vs. the large and 
posh offices in which Pierce & Co.’s brokerage network had expanded); slashing offices’ overhead 
costs via, for instance, reduction of staff and support personnel, and employing cheaper 
telecommunications.  
The second group of policies gave precise meaning to the concept of “customer focus”—if the 
Merrill Lynch strategy is built around the customer, what specific customer needs should it serve? 
Merrill thought the customers he targeted cared about price, an assumption that drove the first group 
of policies. As we saw, he also believed in the importance of equality, which, to him, meant a culture 
of unconditional respect for all customers had to be pivotal to Merrill Lynch. In addition, Braun 
confirmed that customers did not have confidence in Wall Street in general, and Pierce & Co. in 
particular. Further, they were grossly ignorant about the world of financial services. These two deficits 
resulted in a series of policy choices, among which a select few stood out. First, everything in the sales 
domain had to be done according to a principle of full transparency. For instance, customers needed to 
have the same information about the securities for sale as did the broker. Further, Merrill Lynch would 
only sell securities it also owned. Also, the pricing scheme should be totally transparent so that even 
unsophisticated customers could understand it. Finally, it was decided that the company should charge 
the minimum commission allowed by the New York Stock Exchange (a move consistent with the 
overall low-cost low-price strategy but also designed to signal that Merrill Lynch did not take 
advantage of customers). The second policy was that brokers would be paid a fixed monthly salary as 
opposed to a commission, a major deviation from industry practice. This was perhaps the most 
controversial of all policies—it represented a radical change for the broker—but also one that Merrill 
and Braun considered crucial to signal the company’s uniqueness in its commitment to honesty. 
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Merrill initially resisted this policy. Braun had to work hard to persuade him of the policy’s merits, 
and looking back in his later years, Merrill conceded that this particular policy was the single most 
important one of the new Merrill Lynch (Smith, 2013, p 143).  The third policy (or set of policies) 
involved the “creation” of a customers’ man that would fit the company’s new strategy. Merrill 
thought that pursuing the kind of customer focus he had in mind required employees who fully 
identified with the company. Therefore, he tried to create an empowered broker, someone “industrious 
and honest” who did not need much supervision (a cost-saving move too) but genuinely acted in the 
best interest of the company. Indeed, “Remember now, men work for money, they work for 
appreciation, they work for affection, they work for the joy of going somewhere. Some men, and I am 
one of them, like to work because it is dangerous or challenging, or impossible. They are the type of 
fellows we want, and if we have a customers’ man or anybody else in this organization, who is not 
willing to enlist under that banner, then, gentlemen, the sooner we get rid of him, the better” (WAMT: 
74).  
Third, in addition to informing some key HR policies, the goals of improving public trust and 
investor education also informed the company’s approach to marketing. As Braun put it, “Merely 
adopting policies and practices that are sound and that are right…won’t be enough. You must keep in 
mind the long background of public suspicion. You have got a terrific job of producing conviction, of 
getting people to believe you; and that means that in creating the right package you also have the 
further problem of putting new twists on every aspect of it, dramatizing every aspect of it, making it so 
dramatic, so shocking that you get conviction; you must seem to be right in addition to being right” 
(WAMT: 46).  This imperative led to some unusual choices. For instance: Merrill wanted to publish an 
annual report, a very informative one, which was an unusual policy back then. He wanted to advertise 
broadly, which was unusual in the industry, and to do so in a factual, informative way, which was even 
more unusual. Finally, he wanted to use the press more extensively than other firms did: “On a 
number of occasions we will sit down with fellows we know that work for newspapers, and we will tell 
them what we are trying to do, and we will give them the facts, and how they interpret those facts and 
how they write the story is their business, and nobody in this firm has the authority to go to one 
reporter and complain as to how he interprets the facts we have given him.” (WAMT: 90). In general, 
there is an attempt to reach the customer in a straightforward, matter-of-fact way, using her language. 
As the Fortune 1941 article put it: “In short, the customers wrote the advertisements” (Fortune, 1941: 
116). 
 
Merrill’s idea vs Pierce & Co. in 1940 
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We did not find detailed descriptions of the strategy of Pierce & Co. in 1940, but we could infer its 
main elements from WAMT15, the biography of Merrill by Perkins (1999), the history of Merrill 
Lynch by Smith (2013), as well as the other contemporary sources that we used for triangulation 
purposes. Figure 2 maps the key elements of Pierce & Co.’s strategy. Pierce & Co. was a traditional 
Wall Street brokerage firm, which targeted the standard elitist market, adopted standard HR practices 
(e.g., compensation, incentives, typology of employees), related to the customers in a standard way 
(e.g., the customer was a source of revenue, not someone to serve in the best possible way), had 
standard operations (e.g., an emphasis on high churn and in-depth advice), and organized in ways that 
were standard at that time (e.g., many of the advice functions were carried out in local branches as 
opposed to the central office, and some research functions too). There were two notable departures of 
Pierce & Co. from the norm. First, compared to the competition, Pierce & Co. had an especially 
widespread presence in the territory. In fact, it had the largest network of branches (even without 
accounting its close partnership with Cassatt & Co., which de facto deepened the network in the 
Northeast of the United States). Additionally, Pierce & Co. also had a commodities business, and the 
accompanying access to big industrialists. Second, Edward Pierce was at the forefront of a crusade to 
fight the proliferation of ruthless speculators that, according to some, were the real cause of Wall 
Street’s crisis. Since compensation was commission-based, high churn was the norm, but the company 
preferred to trade solid companies that could provide long-term returns than high-risk securities with 
less-than-solid economic foundations. In today’s parlance, Pierce & Co. had a value-orientation.  
 
																																																								
15 Indeed, Braun and Merrill described the new company they had in mind largely against the background of what Merrill 
inherited and the broader Wall Street  
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Figure 2: Pierce & Co.’s central policies in 1940 
 
We could paint a more nuanced image of Pierce & Co.’s strategy, but we believe this summary 
description is sufficient to answer our first question. Contrasting Figure 1 and Figure 2 offers a 
striking demonstration of the discontinuous nature of Merrill’s strategic conception relative to Pierce 
& Co.’s. Of the many subsystems of Figure 1, there is little trace in Figure 2. But there are two 
important exceptions—the extensiveness of Pierce & Co.’s network of offices, and the value-oriented 
culture of Pierce and the company. These elements are hard-to-build resources that played an 
important role in Merrill’s envisioned strategy. However, and this answers our second question, we 
did not find any evidence of these elements playing any direct role to spark Merrill’s idea. In sum, in 
1940 when Merrill saw the final picture of the puzzle, very few, albeit “heavy,” pieces of the puzzle 
existed, and they did not appear to help him see the picture. We thus interpret this case as being 
somewhat anomalous relative to the preadaptation model, especially P3PR and P4PR.  
 
4.2 Cognitive View: Analogical Narrative 
We have shown that by the time Merrill took the helm of Merrill Lynch, he had a clear representation 
of the strategy he wanted the company to pursue. To put the analogical model to work, we need 
evidence of the extent to which this representation was the product of analogical reasoning, and, if so, 
how the analogy was drawn. In particular, we direct our inquiry in two directions, which correspond to 
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two questions. To start, and most obviously, is there evidence that Merrill’s basic strategic idea was a 
(more or less direct) product of a “case” contained in Merrill’s memory? If the answer to this question 
is in the positive, then a second question is in order: is there evidence of Merrill assessing the 
similarity between the chosen analogue and the situation at hand, and, if so, how did he do so? The 
reason for this question is that similarity assessment is not only a defining feature of analogical 
reasoning, but also the place where the potential of analogy as a reliable source of foresight lies. So, 
the question of whether Merrill tested the similarity between source and target problem, and how 
deeply he did so, is a crucial one. In simple words, it would be important to establish whether Merrill 
was just the lucky carrier of a winning analogy, or if there is something in the process he followed that 
can be learned and generalized from.  
Based on WAMT, the answer to the first question is unambiguous: the conceptual anchor around 
which Merrill developed the new strategy for Merrill Lynch is his theory of merchandising, as we 
explained in the prior section. Let us examine, for instance, how Merrill explains the origin of his idea 
at the beginning of the New York meeting. Merrill begins with an identity statement: “Although I am 
supposed to be an investment banker, I think I am truly a grocery man at heart. I have been in the 
chain store business, you know, ever since 1912” (WAMT: 6). He immediately follows this statement 
with the description of “my theory of merchandising,” which in the next paragraph becomes “our 
theory of merchandising” (WAMT: 8), because “in our business and in every business that deals with 
the public, there are two types of customers…” The conclusion is that, as a result, Merrill Lynch must 
adopt the policies of his theory of merchandising. To paraphrase: 1) I know the grocery “case” well, 
especially the chain store format; 2) based on my business experience, I formed a high-level 
understanding of grocery/merchandising16; 3) this theory is generalizable to financial services because 
there is no fundamental difference between what the public wants in this business and what it wants in 
grocery/merchandising; 4) given this similarity, the basic strategy we’re going to adopt is based on my 
theory of merchandising. It is thus Merrill’s experience with the chain store format in grocery, a very 
salient “case” in his memory (of which Merrill held a coarse representation), which led to his initial 
strategic insight.  
If the centrality of this case is apparent, it is much less apparent the extent to which Merrill 
searched for and then rejected other potential sources of analogy. As mentioned earlier, Merrill’s 
experience was broad. He had had direct managerial experiences in a variety of businesses, including 
the auto business, movie distribution, and publishing. Some of these experiences were deep, but not as 																																																								
16 Based on Merrill’s description of his theory of merchandising in WAMT, contemporary articles on Merrill Lynch, and 
interviews with Merrill, it is clear that what he has in mind when he speaks of merchandising is Safeway and the grocery 
business. Most likely, the fact that he calls it “my theory of merchandising” reflects his belief that it can be generalized to 
several other merchandising settings.  
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salient as his experience at Safeway. In the documents we analyzed there is no evidence of any search 
process involving any of these experiences.17 We think the saliency of the “supermarket” memory was 
such that this is the only case he took into consideration; or that other less salient memories received 
only cursory attention.  
Moving to similarity, it might be worth asking what, in this case, the deep assessment of similarity 
would entail. According to the analogical model, the key challenge for Merrill would require meeting 
at least two conditions. First, Merrill would need to form an appreciation of the causal structure of the 
“grocery/Safeway” case or memory: What features of Safeway were essential to its success and why? 
And what structural characteristics of the grocery business were especially conducive to the success of 
a company like Safeway? Second, Merrill would need to assess the similarity between grocery and 
financial services through the lenses of this causal structural interpretation of grocery.  
Merrill met both conditions. He met the first by relying on his theory of merchandising, and the 
second via the assignment he gave to Mr. Braun, as well as the extensive fact finding and analysis he 
did with Winthrop Smith. Let us consider in more detail how he met each condition. 
 Merrill’s theory of merchandising was effectively a theory of performance in grocery, a causal 
theory: a reduced form representation of what key features of Safeway led to success in grocery and 
why. Merrill was vocal about what these features were, and we outlined them in the prior section. He 
was less vocal about the structural conditions of the grocery business under which this theory holds 
true, but it is clear from the records that he thought a few conditions needed to be met. In no particular 
order: there had to be substantial economies of scale, or having a size advantage would not allow 
offering both superior quality and best price; customers had to be sensitive to both the substantive 
attributes of the service and its price, and much less so about the shopping environment, including 
shop-floor service; relatedly, customers had to be sensitive to “egalitarian” treatment. At the time he 
was strategizing for Merrill Lynch, Merrill thought these conditions were met in the supermarket 
business, and were essential to Safeway’s success. In this sense, Merrill passed the first test for an in-
depth assessment of similarity: he was looking at the source problem via a theory of performance, 
which channeled his attention to structural conditions (or, more precisely, conditions he perceived as 
being structurally relevant).  
The next question is whether Merrill assessed rigorously the existence of these conditions in 
financial services, or, alternatively, he did not go beyond the hunch that led him to consider grocery in 																																																								
17 WAMT contains several references to other businesses or companies Merrill had been involved in, directly or indirectly. 
Yet, they are typically used as examples of minor assertions and do not seem to have played a role to the overall strategic 
direction of the company.  The only exception might be his experience in the publishing industry, helping create and run 
Family Circle, a magazine that was distributed free of charge in Safeway Stores. Some of this experience was drawn upon 
when Merrill used informational booklets on financial analysis and investing as a means of educating the “masses” and to 
attract them into buying financial instruments. 
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the first place. To start answering this question, we need to realize that Merrill believed hunches are 
often misleading. Consider what he said on his early experiences with Safeway: “And I give you my 
word that, notwithstanding every effort on my part to learn something about the chain store business—
and there was a time when I thought I knew almost all there was to know about it—I awoke with an 
awful thud in 1931, with the very irritating and humiliating discovery that I didn’t know a damned 
thing about it. Well, that is a pretty place to start from. The reason why I didn’t know anything about it 
was because nobody in the grocery business knew anything about it. I had been fed reams and reams 
and reams of misinformation… The people that gave me the information spoke from memory, from 
hunch, intuition, tradition, the general feel of the business. But they had nothing, I assure you, to 
support their conclusions” (WAMT: 5). It is for this reason—that he did not completely trust his 
hunch that the business of selling canola oil and yogurt and the business of selling financial services 
were similar—that Merrill hired Braun. In his words: “I just put myself in the corner and asked, “Well, 
listen here, young fellow, how much do you really know and how much of it is what is left in the sleeve 
of memory after all the years you have been in Wall Street? And then we decided […] that, by George, 
we would start out and try to find some facts, not what we thought or what we hoped or what we said 
we thought; we decided we would go right out to where this thing starts, then we would go and talk to 
the customer, or, in grocery terms, to the consumer. [...] So, we enlisted an organization known as 
Braun and Company to make a factual survey of the situation in Los Angeles” (WAMT: 10).  
Indeed, much of the factual evidence that Merrill asked Braun to assemble went precisely in the 
direction of “testing” the “structural conditions” discussed above. First, Merrill was concerned that the 
typical customer shopping for grocery in a supermarket might be interested in different dimensions of 
service compared to the typical customer shopping for securities in a brokerage firm, which might 
result in the limited applicability of his theory of merchandising to financial services. One of Merrill’s 
biggest concerns had to do with customers’ confidence in brokerage houses, a very diffused concern 
back then. Indeed, in the late thirties, when Wall Street was at the peak of one of its worst crises, the 
Security Exchange commissioned a survey to Elmo Roper (one of the very first pollsters in the 
country) to find out about customer sentiment. The results showed an alarming lack of confidence 
toward Wall Street, and deep ignorance regarding its most basic functions (Sobel, 2000). Most Wall 
Street bankers dismissed the surveys, but Merrill was concerned, as was Edward Pierce. Therefore, 
Merrill asked Braun to do something akin to the Roper surveys, but geared toward the company’s 
customers, and with one crucial addition: an emphasis not only on customers’ confidence, but also on 
what customers wanted Merrill Lynch to do more broadly--what kind of service and at what price. For 
instance, he wanted to know the relative importance of features such as price, the perception of being 
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treated equally no matter their socio-economic status, the elegance of the shopping environment, the 
perceived reliability of the broker, the type of securities of interest, and several others. 
The second question for Braun was about the company’s operations. Merrill was well aware of his 
ignorance of what was going on at the shop floor level. Relatedly, he was ignorant of the real extent of 
the economies of scale in financial services, and, more broadly, the extent of the potential cost savings 
were Merrill Lynch to adopt a Safeway-like strategy including Safeway’s strong emphasis on 
frugality. Therefore, he asked Braun to paint a detailed picture of a typical branch’s activities—what 
brokers did in detail, how they used staff resources, what motivated them, how they were 
compensated, how they dealt with the public, what their relationship with the central office was, and 
anything that could help understand actual operations—and the associated cost structure.  
Braun responded to Merrill’s requests with a data-driven and detailed analysis. On the customer 
front, he profiled both current and potential customers (the ascending middle-upper class). On the 
operations front, he performed an in-depth analysis of the current cost structure of a typical branch, but 
he did not stop there. In addition, in order to assess the similarity between grocery and financial 
services, Braun and Merrill articulated in detail the central elements of a strategy for Merrill Lynch 
that would be consistent with Merrill’s theory of merchandising, and assessed its viability through a 
detailed estimation of cost and potential revenues (size of the current and potential market, and 
customer’s willingness to pay). In fact, this survey was so central to the new strategy that Winthrop H. 
Smith, Merrill’s soon-to-be second in command, a fellow Amherst alum, former employee and partner 
at the old Merrill, Lynch &Co., would go on to say that “This survey will be ever memorable in the 
annals of the firm; from it we based our policies and to it we are largely indebted for whatever success 
we may have achieved.” (Smith, 2013, p 141).18 
In addition to Braun’s survey and analyses, Merrill also conducted extensive analyses with 
Winthrop Smith, then a partner at Pierce & Co. In fact, it was Smith who approached Merrill with the 
idea of returning to Wall Street. In the fall of 1939, Merrill met Smith in Chicago while on his way to 
the West Coast for one his routine visits to oversee the operations of Safeway. Smith tried to convince 
Merrill that “fresh capital and an aggressive reduction of overhead could turn the combined firm into 
a moneymaker” (Smith, 2013, p 139). Merrill was intrigued and they went over the numbers 
repeatedly that weekend. Three weeks later, Merrill returned and Smith had more detailed financial 
projections for him. Still unconvinced, Merrill invited Smith over to New York between Thanksgiving 																																																								
18 We should also acknowledge the possibility that Braun and his analysis was also used by Merrill as an instrument of 
persuasion. At the Waldorf-Astoria meeting in 1940, Merrill was trying to convince a group of very experienced brokers to 
take on policies that were very different from things they were used to. This was a significant persuasion challenge, and one 
has to think that bombarding them with the sort of detailed numbers-driven market analysis performed by Braun should have 
helped the cause. But the historical evidence above should indicate that Braun and his data also played a major role in the 
strategy formulation. 
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and Christmas, and again starting the New Year to keep working on the numbers. According to Smith, 
“We worked late into the nights for the whole month and never seemed able to get the right 
combination of figures that satisfied Merrill. I went back to Chicago for Christmas and came to New 
York the first of the year and resumed work. We never seemed to be able to come up with the right 
answers, and it began to look very much as though Merrill was going to throw over the whole idea of 
a merger.” (Smith, 2013, p 140). Merrill even sent out a survey to his longtime associates, asking 
them “What would Eddie Lynch have done?” In end, Merrill did decide to go ahead with the merger, 
and the rest is history. 
 
4.3 Economic View: Positioning Narrative 
The cognitive account we just put forth suggests that Merrill’s cognitive representation of financial 
services and the associated strategic choices had analogical roots. To put the positioning model to 
work, we need to assess what role reasoning from first economic principles played in Merrill’s 
strategic innovation. What we find is that although this type of reasoning was on the surface less 
prominent than analogy, it complemented and supplemented analogy in at least two important ways: in 
the way Merrill developed his theory of merchandising, and in the way he adapted it to the 
idiosyncrasies of the financial services business. We now discuss them in turn. 
The emphasis of the analogical narrative was on Merrill’s theory of merchandising, which led him 
to ground his assessment of the similarity between the Safeway/grocery and the Merrill 
Lynch/financial services cases on causally relevant characteristics as opposed to superficial ones. The 
logic was that Merrill’s theory was really a theory of performance, an extrapolation of factors that he 
believed to be causally relevant to performance. But what if the theory is flawed? A flawed theory 
would lead to the assessment of similarity based on features that, while perceived to play a causal role, 
might in fact be irrelevant to performance. Thus, a flawed theory does not filter out flawed analogies, 
which begs the question of how a robust theory of performance can be had.  
The positioning model would answer that applying appropriate economic principles to the 
competitive situation at hand should return an accurate theory of performance of said situation—a 
theory that, depending on the situation at hand, helps formulate a new strategic solution, or explain 
why an existing strategy works well or poorly. We suggest that Merrill’s theory of merchandising 
reflects the application of what can be construed as economic principles, which, if our interpretation is 
correct, contributed to make it a robust basis for Merrill’s analogizing. This suggestion is grounded on 
a set of clues we observed in the historical records. Specifically, we detected some patterns in how 
Merrill described his theory of merchandising and in Merrill’s strategic decisions in grocery, banking, 
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and elsewhere19 that are strikingly aligned with the precepts of the modern positioning school. We 
interpret these patterns as the equivalent of a revealed preference in the domain of reasoning, with 
Merrill’s decisions revealing a particular way of thinking: a revealed mindset he consciously or 
unconsciously employed in thinking about strategic problems or competitive situations that was 
recurrent and therefore predictable in its key traits. According to this interpretation, Merrill can be 
viewed as a modern strategist ante litteram: his strategic thinking appears to have followed economic 
principles long before such principles had been made available to practitioner strategists.20 The reader 
should know that this conjecture cannot be proved conclusively given the available historical records. 
The fact that we observed patterns that are suggestive of beliefs and principles that are (consciously or 
unconsciously) deployed to think about a problem does not guarantee that Merrill did indeed have 
such principles. A particular set of decisions can be consistent with a particular general belief, but they 
can also reflect considerations other than the general belief. For sure, the historical records contain 
public statements by Merrill or Merrill’s contemporaries that strongly corroborate our interpretation. 
But again, ours is an informed conjecture.   
The first pattern we detected is what we consider the most defining element of Merrill’s mindset. 
It both permeates Merrill’s description of his theory of merchandising and characterizes the essence of 
his past decision-making. In a nutshell, no matter the competitive setting he was in, Merrill would not 
face competition frontally. He would compete via drastic deviations from the status quo. Merrill 
consistently tried to create companies that were “different” from the competition in ways that he 
thought were economically meaningful. And this is also how his contemporaries understood him 
(Smith, 2013). For Fortune magazine (Fortune, 1941: 104): “Short when competitors had been 
unwisely long, out when they were in, Merrill had made a fortune by strokes that had been cried down 
as pipe dreams, just as his new policy has been scorned.” Reading his description of his theory of 
merchandising suggests that, to him, Safeway (or any other successful merchandising company) was 
not a success because it was one of several companies delivering a good product or service, or because 
it adopted the chain store format. Its superior performance was rooted in it being uniquely, and 
favorably, different. What made Safeway successful was that it was unique, and superior, in its 
interpretation of the chain store format. Indeed, during his tenure at the helm of Safeway, Merrill 
dictated a series of moves that at once deepened the company’s uniqueness in ways that allowed it to 
serve its customers better or reduce costs. To cite but one example, in 1932 Merrill convinced Life 																																																								
19 Even in his personal life. For instance, the way Merrill, the (relatively) poor Southern outsider competed (for reputation, 
prestige, women) with the rich New Englanders that populated Amherst College and later in New York at the turn of the 
century is deeply similar to his way of strategizing in business settings.     
20 A perceptive reviewer suggested that this evidence should not be at all surprising. In the reviewer’s words: “The principles 
of the positioning school were developed in large part by observing cases such as Merrill Lynch. Porter (1985) and 
Ghemawat and Rivkin (1998) even mention Merrill Lynch by name.”  
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magazine’s managing editor Harry Evans to co-found Family Circle (which Merrill founded out of his 
own pockets because Safeway’s CEO M.B. Skaggs did not want to make it a division of Safeway), a 
magazine targeting women that would be distributed free of charge in Safeway stores and other 
supermarket chains to drive traffic. Family Circle was the first store-distributed magazine in the US. 
Second, despite his reputation for being a bold original thinker, Merrill was profoundly aware that 
unorthodoxy is a source of trouble when not coupled with strong analytics (Perkins, 1999; Smith, 
2013). And that was the essence of the Charlie and Edmund couple: Merrill’s creative leaps found in 
Lynch the austere and severe analytical interpreter. Merrill valued his analytical counterpart to the 
point that he went on record several times for saying that his success was largely due to Lynch’s 
discipline21. And when the two partners grew distant, Merrill handpicked highly skilled replacements 
such as Mr. Braun. In this sense, it should not be surprising that when talking about Safeway, what he 
described as “a vital part, one of the vital segments of Safeway’s operation” (WAMT: 10) was a 
“public relations and research unit,” to study customers, keep them happy, and to monitor Safeway’s 
costs, because that is where “this thing starts” (WAMT: 10). This is the key: for Merrill the “thing” 
starts with what value is delivered to customers and what it cost to deliver it—these are Merrill’s 
central categories of thought when he thought about Safeway, Merrill Lynch, or more generally a 
company’s strategy and success. 
To illustrate, using some of the quotes from earlier: “Most merchants say that they are 
competitive, that their prices are fair, provided they think they are striking an arithmetical average. 
That hasn’t got a damned thing to do with our theory of merchandising”... “When a customer comes to 
the Safeway Store, to be specific, she is entitled to buy the best merchandise in the market that she can 
find any place in that city, and she is entitled to buy with confidence that she is getting full value at the 
lowest possible price that can be found in any one store in that town” (WMAT: 8). And Safeway’s 
profits come from “what there was left in our pockets after meeting the lowest competitive prices in 
town, and from that subtracting the cost of our merchandise, which we tried to buy in the lowest 
possible market” (WAMT: 7). The bottom line is that a pattern that is clearly visible in Merrill’s 
descriptions of Safeway, his theory of merchandising, and the strategy he devised for Merrill Lynch is 
that key to a company’s strategy is the economic meaningfulness of its uniqueness, which has to be 
assessed in terms of the value delivered to customers and the cost incurred to create such value.  
The third pattern is something that, while certainly present in WMAT, we did not find in other 
historical records. It is a theme throughout WMAT that every single choice needed to be consistent 
with each other, and with Safeway’s overarching identity, cultural traits, and brand. For instance, 																																																								
21 Indeed, when Charlie took the helm of Pierce & Co. and changed its name to Merrill Lynch, E. A. Pierce, and Cassatt, he 
had to fight hard to add and and then keep “Lynch” in the name of the company.  
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“When a woman comes into a store, she is entitled to buy her coffee at the lowest price, and her bread, 
her butter, and every item in that store. And then she is entitled to do something else, to get something 
else; she is entitled to buy items that are not frequently sold, slow turnover merchandise, at the lowest 
possible competitive price, because infrequently purchased items stick in the mind of the customer, 
and if the customer pays five cents too much per bottle of vanilla extract, and she runs into some 
friend and she finds out that the friend has bought an unimportant item at five cents cheaper than she 
had paid for it at Safeway, then, by George, her confidence in the whole operation is shocked.” Here 
the point is that the temptation of charging higher prices for certain items needs to be resisted because 
it is not consistent with Safeway’s overall image in the eyes of the consumers, and could affect their 
interest in purchasing grocery from Safeway. For a similar reason, and because a key policy of 
Safeway was to accept all customers no matter their wallet or social status, Merrill thought it was 
fundamental to treat all customers the same way, as we have seen above. In general, WAMT contains 
extensive references that can be readily interpreted as suggestive of “systemic thinking.”  
To sum up, Merrill did not think Safeway was successful solely because it used the chain store 
format, a model other firms employed with varying degrees of success. Merrill had a love affair with 
the chain store format, but he thought a superior interpretation of the format such as Safeway’s derived 
from: a) Safeway’s distinctiveness; b) a distinctiveness that meant being unique along measurable 
dimensions of service that customers cared about and a superior and measurable cost structure; c) a 
distinctiveness that was supported by a system of policies that were deeply consistent with each other. 
These three points well describe some of the most fundamental principles of the positioning approach 
to strategy (Porter, 1996; Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996).  
First, as Ghemawat and Rivkin (2006: 7) would put it, “The notion of added value highlights the 
fact that competitive advantage derives fundamentally from scarcity. A firm establishes added value by 
making sure it is unique in some valuable way.” Similarly, Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) note that 
“[Under conditions of unrestricted bargaining], the key to a firm’s achieving a positive added value 
was seen to be the existence of a favorable asymmetry between the firm and its competitors.” 
(Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996: 23), and “Possession of a positive added value is the key to value 
appropriation” (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996: 6).  These propositions capture well Merrill’s focus 
on uniqueness relative to the competition. Second, the concepts of competitive advantage and added 
value are premised on the categories of customers’ willingness to pay, and firm’s costs. Take the 
above quotes. There, the concept of valuable in being “unique in some valuable way,” or favorable in 
“favorable asymmetry,” both refer to a firm’s uniqueness in its ability to command a wider wedge 
between the willingness-to-pay of its customers and its costs relative to its competitors. This is 
precisely the way Merrill conceived of Safeway’s uniqueness. Finally, the notion of alignment or fit 
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has been one of the leitmotivs of this school of strategic thought. The simple idea is that “different 
choices interact with one another: production decisions affect marketing choices, distribution choices 
need to fit with operations decisions, compensation choices influence a whole range of activities, and 
so forth. Each interaction implies that a choice made on one dimension affects the cost and 
willingness-to-pay impact of another choice” (Ghemawat and Rivkin, 2006: 18). Because of the 
existence of these interactions, critical to the success of a firm’s strategy is that its activities be 
aligned. Indeed, “A firm whose choices are internally inconsistent is unlikely to succeed” (Ghemawat 
and Rivkin, 2006: 18). Once again, this looks like a line taken from Merrill’s description of Safeway.  
We believe there is a second way in which first principles entered the equation. We have seen that 
in order to assess the similarity between grocery and financial services, Merrill and Braun pushed far 
the translation of Merrill’s theory of merchandising into a coherent and detailed set of policies for 
Merrill Lynch. A translation such as this is a one-to-many mapping: there are many ways in which a 
coarse representation, what Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) call a template, can take practical form in a 
system of activities. For instance, “best” in the policy “sell the best product in town” can take on many 
different meanings, and the same can be said for all of the other elements of Merrill’s theory of 
merchandising, such as exploiting economies of scale, becoming a frugal organization, treating all 
customers equal, et cetera. Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) note that “Conceptually, there seem to be two 
basic mechanisms that flesh out such a template. One is the existing set of routines and behaviors of 
the organization. These actions may serve as defaults for choices that are not specified by the 
template. Alternatively, the template, and possibly past practices, may serve as a starting point for a 
process of experiential learning.” Somewhat surprisingly, in the case under scrutiny neither of these 
mechanisms played a primary role. As our evolutionary narrative suggests, Merrill’s rendition of the 
new strategy largely rejected past practices of Pierce & Co. Further, Merrill did not use his coarse 
theory of merchandising as a starting point for a process of experiential learning, i.e., a process of 
online local search. Merrill used this template as a starting point for a process of off-line distant 
search. Interestingly, the new policies identified early on underwent very little adjustment as time 
went on. As Perkins (1999: 161) noted, “Confessing at the outset that the new concepts were 
experimental and might need to be adjusted or even abandoned altogether, Charlie was nonetheless 
optimistic about the practicality of the reforms. In retrospect, one of the remarkable aspects of the 
implementation of the new policies was how little of the original plan required modification as the 
months and years passed.” Based on the available records, we identified two main steps through 
which Merrill designed a strategy for Merrill Lynch – a thorough economic analysis of the 
market/industry, followed by careful choices of policies as informed by certain economic first 
principles.  
	 36	
First, we already commented on the extensive market analysis and financial projections that 
Merrill and colleagues undertook prior to embarking on the new journey. This analysis gave Merrill 
some direct answers about the similarity between the supermarket business and financial services (e.g., 
that customers were not especially interested in stylish offices; that there was significant untapped 
demand for financial services in the middle-upper class; or that the cost structure was such that 
economies of scale would be substantial), and also offered precious suggestions about what kind of 
specific policies Merrill Lynch could adopt in order to fit Merrill’s theory of merchandising to the 
peculiarities of financial services. As Braun put it: “Since we have a measurement, a pretty accurate 
measurement, of what they [customers] want, it hasn’t been any difficult trick to build some 
specifications in terms of policies and practices that would meet these consumers want” (WAMT: 45). 
Second, in addition to the answers directly provided by the survey, we believe that some of 
Merrill’s judgment calls were helped by some of the same economic first principles that underlay his 
theory of merchandising. While the evidence for the application of such abstract principles in his 
thinking is less direct at this stage, there are hints.  
For instance, Merrill’s narrative contains many indications that the principles of uniqueness and fit 
were very relevant to his policy making. Merrill wanted a company that was both radically different 
(and better in serving the middle-to-upper class) and premised on a set of interdependent choices so 
that existing competitors would be outclassed, and potential entrants would find it too difficult to 
enter, because Merrill Lynch should be too good and too difficult to imitate. In Merrill’s words: “We 
will use every legitimate competitive and aggressive method to bring customers to us. We will compete 
with anybody in a fair and square fight, but we must have different little displays in our windows, 
different signs on billboards, a little bit different from those of the other fellow” (WAMT: 80); further, 
“Now I want to make a statement of policy which I think is really and truly important. You take a city 
like Spokane, for instance; we have got that market and nobody is in it today but ourselves. The way to 
keep that situation intact is to have the lowest rates of interest, the finest service, the best advertising, 
the finest personnel in Spokane that we have got anywhere in the whole system. Let’s don’t wait for 
two or three or four million shares a day and have a dozen houses want to go into Spokane. Let’s keep 
those customers so fine, so well, that nobody would dare come into that town.” (WAMT: 181-182).  
Further, consider the switch in the compensation of the broker from commission to salary. One 
rationale for this change was Merrill’s preoccupation that “When we give that man a report on a 
certain company, he may not tell us, but in the back of his head is a lot of curiosity and a lot of 
suspicion. He is just wondering all the time, with one-half of his brain, “How much of this can I rely 
on? What is behind it? Why should this customer’s man show me these facts and figures regarding a 
company that I never heard before? What is his motive?”(WAMT 65-66). The move away from the 
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commission system, if properly advertised, would attenuate this skepticism. But this was an extreme 
measure, one that represented a major shift from standard practice in the Wall Street of the era, and 
Merrill was aware of its risk. Merrill also knew that he could have pursued a more conservative 
approach, for instance prohibiting the sale of certain classes of risky securities or similar measures. So, 
why did he take the risk? We think his reasoning was that the more extreme the choices he made, the 
better Merrill Lynch could serve its customers, and the more difficult it would be to imitate. Indeed, 
for him moving to the commission system of compensation was also an instrument to implement 
another extreme choice: getting rid of normal, standard brokers. Merrill was aware that the new 
Merrill Lynch strategy was an “impossible” bet. Therefore, he thought he needed people who are 
motivated by “impossible” dreams. He wanted ambitious idealists. As we have seen above, he wanted 
men who “like to work because it is dangerous or challenging or impossible.” (WAMT: 74). Merrill 
believed the move to the commission system would help him get rid of the type of greedy, 
competitive, ruthless broker that was most diffused at that time. Only that way, “we can construct an 
organization with that spirit, and it will be so obvious that all of our competitors will say, “Well, by 
George, there is one firm that I would like to work for and be associated with.”22 
 Thus, Merrill, along with his associates, was able to design an integrated set of policy choices 
that allowed the firm to carve out a unique position in the competitive landscape, one that generated a 
high willingness to pay on the part of the customers while driving massive economies of scale to lower 
costs. And while evidence is not watertight that Merrill was actively aware of these abstract principles, 
and that the rigorous application of these principles is what led to the exact policy choices he 
introduced, there seem to be strong indicators that he was indeed applying these ideas. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our opening statement was that the question of strategic foresight is central to strategy and yet a 
divisive one. Our closing statement is that a better path to foresight is one of integration rather than 
division; and that we now have a better understanding of what such path (at least a path) entails. In this 
last section, we uncover this path by first articulating a fourth narrative that integrates the salient 
elements of the three narratives we described earlier, and then encapsulating its meaning into a model 
of foresight that combines evolution with agency.    
 
5.1 An Integrated Narrative of Strategic Foresight: Evidence in Outline. 
																																																								
22 It should be noted that the evidence here is more that the chosen policies were consistent with the economic first principles, 
and less directly for their explicit application, perhaps with the exception of the quote about differentiation. 
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There may well be facets of the Merrill Lynch story that the theory-informed narratives we constructed 
fail to capture, but the ones they capture emerged with force. Taken together, they configure a fourth 
narrative that gravitates around Merrill’s theory of merchandising, and hinges on the processes of 
abstraction (how Merrill abstracted it from the complex reality of merchandising), and articulation 
(how Merrill articulated it to fit the reality of financial service so that he could evaluate the theory’s 
viability in the new domain). This is the story of a journey from reality to theory, and then back, in a 
different domain. In outline: 
 
Element 1: Merrill’s theory of merchandising. It is around his theory merchandising, a theory of 
performance, that Merrill gives new meaning to financial services. This cognitive representation is 
“coarse” in the sense that it captures cause and effect at a high level of abstraction.  
 
Element 2: Abstraction. Merrill attained a robust theory of merchandising on the basis of (at least) two 
documentable influences:  
• His experience with the chain model of business, especially but not only in grocery.  
• Some select economic principles that appear to have guided the interpretation of such 
experiences, whether Merrill was self-aware of them or not. 
 
Element 3: Articulation. Merrill carefully assessed if the key causal mechanisms of his theory of 
merchandising held true in financial services. To do so, he and Braun articulated his theory via the 
identification of a system of detailed policies for Merrill Lynch. This process of articulation was 
rooted in (at least) two documentable processes:  
• Comprehensive data gathering and analysis focused on Pierce & Co. and its current and 
potential customers, guided by Merrill’s theory of merchandising. 
• The use of first principles to aid the identification of new policies for Merrill Lynch.  
 
We think these three pivotal categories, together, capture the essence of the focal events. But there is 
something that, while still part of the narrative, is not properly emphasized when one considers its 
importance to the outcomes of interest: the depth of Merrill’s experiences (especially with Safeway), 
and its breadth (his involvement in a variety of similar merchandising enterprises). We think this lack 
of emphasis has to do with the theoretical idiosyncrasies of the models we used, which is something 
that needs to be corrected as we explain below. For now, we just add it to the integrated narrative as a 
fact not sufficiently emphasized. 
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Element 4: A de-emphasized element: The depth and breadth of Charles’s experience. That Merrill 
knew Safeway very well, and that he had an unusually large set of experiences in other grocery firms 
and other merchandising businesses is a fact. It is also true that our narrative recognizes the role of this 
knowledge. Trivially, even the smartest agent would not know how to abstract a sensible theory of a 
given reality if she did not know or had poor exposure to the reality in question. What our narrative 
does not sufficiently recognize is the importance of Merrill’s history of direct, hands on, committed 
involvement with Safeway and related businesses. Relative to most of his Wall Street peers, Merrill 
had a deep experience with one specific grocery company, but his experience was broad too given his 
involvement with other supermarkets, and other merchandising companies outside of grocery. And as 
we have shown above, he identified deeply with these ventures, Safeway in particular. This meant, 
among other things, that Merrill had a proactive attitude toward learning about the business even in its 
most detailed aspects. We think this aspect has two consequences that are germane to our narrative. 
First, to the extent that critical to a process of abstraction is the application of the right first principles 
to one’s domain-specific knowledge, the deeper and broader the knowledge, the more accurate, 
sophisticated, and nuanced the abstraction is likely to be. For example, we have seen that Merrill had 
an almost religious belief in treating all customers the same, and that this was a significant part of his 
theory of merchandising. Where did this belief come from? We cannot offer a conclusive answer, but 
a plausible one is that, sometime in the past, Merrill or his strict Safeway collaborators had witnessed 
episodes in which unequal treatment of customers led to setbacks relative to situations in which they 
were treated equal. These experiences then likely resulted in equality becoming part of the “Safeway 
way.” As a result of these events, the experiential basis on which Merrill could abstract a theory of 
performance for Safeway or merchandising more broadly included this idiosyncratic experience, 
which is something that, had Merrill not been deeply involved with Safeway, might have not occurred. 
Stated differently, had Merrill been just an investor or an external consultant, his knowledge of 
operations would have probably not been sufficiently granular to even make him aware of the equality 
issue and that equality was an important policy. Further, the fact that Merrill knew other supermarkets 
and the chain-store format outside of grocery well, presumably gave him more than an opportunity to 
observe variation in this policy and associated outcomes. To the extent that his recurring question 
were: “What makes Safeway meaningfully unique and therefore superior? And is there a successful 
“merchandising” model?” his answers would naturally include the equality aspect. Had he had a 
shallower experience such as that of other bankers or even merchandisers of this time, he would have 
no doubt obtained a shallower answer. Second, we argued that Merrill articulated his coarse theory of 
merchandising largely through what we called an off-line process of distant search, driven by Braun’s 
insightful survey and economic reasoning. For sure these processes played a central role. Yet, there is 
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some evidence that Merrill also used his experience in supermarkets to inform some specific policy 
choices. That is, the wisdom from his past grocery life did not inform exclusively a relatively abstract 
set of strategic principles. It also informed some narrow policy choices.  Policy choices such as those 
of publishing an annual report, pursuing a rigorously fact-based approach to communication, 
monitoring competitors’ billboards and windows so that to ensure that Merrill Lynch’s were different, 
are all examples of individual policies transferred from Safeway to Merrill Lynch with little 
adaptation. In sum: 
• Implications for abstraction. The accuracy and nuance of Merrill’s theory of merchandising 
was helped by the depth and breadth of his experience in grocery and merchandising 
businesses.   
• Implications for articulation. The articulation of Merrill’s theory of merchandising into a 
detailed set of policy choices for Merrill Lynch was helped by his depth of experiences with 
Safeway.  
 
 
5.2 Toward a Model 
a. Limitations and spirit of the exercise 
This integrated narrative is, almost by design, richer than each individual narrative. It offers a fuller 
characterization of the focal events. But our ultimate goal was not to provide a richer characterization 
of this particular event. We also had the more ambitious goal of developing a general understanding of 
disciplined strategic foresight that leverages the strengths of the models we employed and overcomes 
their limitations--in other words, a more potent model of strategic foresight. Can we interpret this 
narrative as being suggestive of such a model?  
We think the answer is in the positive, but it is important to flag the limitations of our 
exercise. The overarching problem is one of learning from a single case, which makes interpretation of 
cause and effect hard (to what extent was Merrill’s success attributable to the process he followed, and 
what parts of the process were especially relevant?), in addition to presenting issues of generalizability 
(what conditions have to hold true so that the replication of Merrill’s process or parts of it can lead to 
similar outcomes?). For instance, skeptics might say that had it not been for the anomalous post-WWII 
excess liquidity that benefited the American middle class in that era, today Merrill would not be 
material for studies such as ours. These skeptics might also say that all Merrill did back in 1940 was a 
theatrical production aimed to persuade skeptics. Thus, if the goal is to advance our understanding of 
strategic foresight, little of what we wrote in this article would be relevant. We think these objections 
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are legitimate. Having lived in close connection with the historical material for a long time, we believe 
they are ultimately unfounded, but we cannot rule them out conclusively.  
To some degree, however, the way we use the narrative here is resistant to some of these 
limitations. Our theory-building exercise is anchored to the models through which we interpreted the 
Merrill story. We use a combination of the evidence we collected and logic to evaluate the models’ 
limitations and how these limitations can be overcome. It is more an exercise in syncretism than it is 
of new theory-generation, although the synthesis that emerges has novel implications. Our questions 
are as follows: can we discern a logical structure in the way Merrill operated that ties the models 
together? Are there apparent ways in which the conjunction of these models makes each of them more 
potent vis-a’-vis the problem of disciplining foresight? And does this evidence suggest new 
interpretations of such models? Even if we cannot determine conclusively the extent to which the 
specific outcomes we observed were determined by Merrill’s process relative to other lucky 
contingencies, we can evaluate, through logic, if the process Merrill employed makes logical sense 
and in what ways it can suggest a more potent model of foresight. Based on this exercise of logical 
deduction inspired by Merrill’s behavior we will argue that the facts leading to Merrill’s strategic 
innovation correspond to an interpretation of each model that transcends common interpretations, in 
addition to (crucially) bringing them together by giving each of them a precise role or function, in 
what appears to be a natural synthesis. It is as if Merrill had known the models and intuited a way to 
combine them that ultimately overcomes some of their limitations. In this sense, we can say that the 
narrative is not a collection of lucky steps, but an archetypal figure that foreshadows a path to 
disciplined foresight that is learnable and generalizable within some bounds, which we define below. 
We use the term archetype of disciplined strategic foresight in the Platonic sense of the term 
archetype—a pure form that embodies fundamental properties of the “thing.” There is no reason to 
believe this is the only possible archetype. There can be other archetypal forms of disciplined 
foresight. But there are good reasons to believe this is an archetype of disciplined foresight. 
 
b. Interpretation of the Integrated Narrative 
So far, we progressed from overarching “views” to “models” to “narratives.” We now reverse the 
approach, and first interpret the specifics of the integrated narrative so that to derive what specific 
model of foresight they seem to configure. We then draw broader implications, namely what “view” of 
foresight this all suggests.  
  
Commentary on Element 1. Although analogy work often takes the “case,” or the “memory” as the 
critical unit of analysis (cfr. Gilboa and Schmeidler, 2001, and Gavetti et al., 2005), here the unit of 
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analysis is an abstraction of it. The cornerstone of Merrill’s thinking is not the case, but rather a causal 
theory of performance of it, a cognitive representation of the causal mechanisms that make a given 
outcome possible in a given setting. The idea is certainly not new in analogy work (see for instance, 
Gentner, 1986 and Gavetti and Rivkin, 2005), but its prominence in the Merrill story is a useful 
reminder of what can effectively be considered a general necessary condition for the attainment of 
reliability in analogy. This point reflects P2.1A.  
 
Commentary on Element 2. The narrative also traces a clear path to the development of a robust theory 
of performance.  In this case, the importance of reasoning from first principles is self-evident. The 
evidence is consistent with P2PO, P2.1PO, and P2.2PO, which state that properly applying the proper 
economic principles to the situation at hand should return a solid causal economic theory of the 
situation at hand. In general, we can assume that the acquisition of relevant first principles is not 
problematic for a committed decision maker, although it is quite possible that even committed 
decision makers can differ in their level of sophistication in the knowledge of relevant first principles. 
Similarly self-evident in this case is the importance of one’s knowledge of the situation at hand, which 
is also implicit in P2PO.  
 
Commentary on Element 3. Postulates P2.1A and P2.2A posit that in similar problems similar actions 
lead to similar outcomes. Further, it posits that in familiar source environments it is possible to grasp 
fundamental cause and effect relationships. The implication is that in order to ascertain the level of 
real similarity, a given “theory of performance” in the source needs to be evaluated in the target 
domain. Consider a continuum of evaluation mechanisms that goes from maximum superficiality (i.e., 
no evaluation) to maximum depth or rigor. What Merrill did appears to sit squarely on the extreme 
right of this continuum. Merrill approached financial services with a theory of what it took to be 
successful in merchandising, and then questioned whether these conditions could be met in financial 
services. To do so, he articulated his theory as far as possible into a system of integrated policies for 
Merrill Lynch, and that is where his rigor in gathering data and properly using first principles allowed 
him to make educated guesses that, for the most part, turned out to be right in the long run. We should 
note that the pre-adapted elements of Merrill Lynch probably helped this evaluative process: as we 
have seen, Pierce & Co. was already a large network, which was an advantage not only in the 
subsequent phases of execution, but also in this phase of evaluation of the analogy: for instance, it is 
easier to make educated guesses on the cost advantages of a chain of offices if the chain already exists 
to a large degree than if it is to be built from scratch. This aspect of Merrill’s articulation/evaluation 
step therefore aligns with the spirit of the preadaptation model, particularly P3PR, which emphasizes 
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the advantages of evaluating changes that are proximate to the status quo. All in all, work on analogy 
is typically silent on how somebody with a good understanding of the familiar source environment can 
assess its similarity to the problem at hand. This case offers a powerful example of how similarity can 
be drawn at a deep level. 
 
Commentary on Element 4. Based on our understanding of the focal story, Merrill’s depth (Safeway) 
and breadth (the broad merchandising space and beyond, including Merrill’s initial banking 
experience) of experience played a primary role. Yet, the depth and breadth of the strategist’s 
experience does not appear to be the focal feature of any of the models we used, although it does not 
conflict with any of them. For the positioning model, the important thing is that the strategist “knows” 
the situation at hand before she can apply the right economic principles. In staying with the intellectual 
roots of the model, how this knowledge is attained is unproblematic, and direct, first-hand, deep 
experience is not a necessary condition. For the analogy model, the important thing is that the 
strategist knows the causal structure of the “source” before she can assess its similarity with the 
situation at hand. How that knowledge is attained is typically not theorized about, and certainly depth 
and breadth of experience is not a central variable (but see Gavetti, Levinthal, and Rivkin (2005) for 
an exception). The role of the strategist’s first-hand experience in domains other than the focal one is 
not a central element of the pre-adaptation model either, where the action is all in the existence of 
capabilities, sub-systems, or policies broadly defined that bring the firm so close to the new 
opportunity that it is hard for the alert strategist not to “see” it. Yet this role of experience is 
profoundly aligned with the broader evolutionary sensibility. The firm Merrill inherited in 1940, was 
very distant from the final puzzle he envisioned; yet what Merrill envisioned was relatively proximate 
to his prior personal experiences, provided he could acquire relevant domain-specific knowledge to 
assess the viability of the idea in financial services and make the translation. In 1940 Merrill Lynch 
was not pre-adapted. Charles Merrill was. He was cognitively pre-adapted, in the sense that he had 
knowledge of past situations that would allow him to see superior solutions that others could not see. 
And that knowledge had little to do with Merrill Lynch. Charles was cognitively pre-adapted because 
a case in his repertoire of cases happened to be structurally similar to the situation at hand, and it 
suggested a superior solution that no one else could see at that time. This observation, if considered 
together with what the other elements of the narrative imply, has important implications for our 
understanding of strategic foresight. Below we pursue these implications.  
What brings all these elements together is that they all express what we view as “general 
truths.” Indeed, the logical conditions that need to be met in order to support this assertion can be 
readily articulated. Specifically, it has to be true that: a) Any competitive situation is governed by 
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predictable and discernable forces that appropriate economic principles single out at least to some 
degree; b) The outcomes of any given competitive strategy or behavior cannot escape these economic 
forces. That is to say that strategy X cannot sustain superior returns if it is in violation of economic 
forces that would predict otherwise; c) Any given competitive situation and associated distribution of 
profits among competing firm in accordance to general economic forces is the expression of complex 
behaviors (i.e., what firms actually do, and how what they do contributes to outcomes) that are only 
partially accessible to decision-makers. For instance, the strategist of company X can understand her 
company’s superior returns are rooted in its uniqueness, but she may have a hard time ascertaining 
what ultimately determines the economic meaningfulness of this uniqueness; d) Ceteris paribus, an 
increase in one’s depth of experience in a given focal domain and breadth of experience in related 
domains (so that meaningful comparisons can be made) increases her ability to interpret this 
complexity; e) Similarly, ceteris paribus, an increase in one’s ability to obtain relevant information 
about relevant aspects of the competitive environment increases her ability to interpret this 
complexity.  
    
 
Figure 3: Evolution Cum Agency 
 
c. Evolution cum Agency: A Path to Disciplined Strategic Foresight. 
What does this all mean for strategic foresight?  
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In its most general form, the first implication is the proposition that relevant historical 
knowledge and discipline, together, can give humans remarkable power of anticipation. Here, the 
emphasis is on “relevant knowledge” and “discipline.” Their meaning and the extent of the challenge 
they pose to foresight is likely to differ in different domains of human activity. In the strategy domain, 
the general proposition is that foreseeing innovative strategies that depart significantly from the status 
quo and their likely outcomes is possible and disciplinable within bounds that can be defined with 
some precision. This implication is valuable for two reasons. First, it can help us interpret, or 
reinterpret accomplishments such as Merrill’s that had been either too quickly dismissed as the result 
of dumb luck, or too quickly celebrated as the achievements of superior intellects. The reality is 
somewhere in between, and we can offer at least one possible interpretation of it. Second and more 
importantly, given the generalizability of the elements of the integrated narrative, as anticipated above, 
we think the narrative represents an (and not the exclusive) archetype of disciplined strategic 
foresight. This means its central traits can be taken as the building blocks of a model of strategic 
foresight.  
The second implication is represented by the precise form this model can take and what it says 
regarding the sources of heterogeneity among agents in their ability to achieve foresight. Developing a 
full-fledged model of strategic foresight is beyond the scope of this article, and we leave it for future 
work. But we can briefly define what its basic elements would be if it were to be built to reflect our 
interpretation of the Merrill case. As evidenced by the prior discussion, we view the model as a 
synthesis of the three models initially articulated, with a crucial requalification of the pre-adaptation 
model from pre-adaptation tout court to cognitive pre-adaptation. In essence, disciplined strategic 
foresight requires that the strategist or group of strategists facing a strategic problem: 
a. Rely upon a reservoir of experiences or “cases” containing a case that is structurally similar to 
the situation at hand. This first point expresses a boundary condition to the possibility of 
intelligent foresight; 
b. Have deep experience with such case and possibly with related cases that can help its 
interpretation. This second point expresses a second, more stringent boundary condition. It is 
this point in particular that expresses the evolutionary sensibility of the model. 
c. Have or abstract an accurate theory of performance of the case or cases that can act as relevant 
source of insight for the problem at hand, via a combination of first economic principles and 
in-depth knowledge of the cases in question. If properly taken, this step should return a set of 
conditions (both contextual, i.e., external to the firm, and organizational) that need to be met 
for the strategy to be viable.   
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d. Evaluate the viability of such theory in the situation at hand. As we have seen above, properly 
taking this step might require the off-line, “pen and yellow-pad,” detailed articulation of the 
“source strategy” in the new domain, which in turn is greatly aided by a combination of 
detailed information about the focal firm and the environment it is in, the use of economic first 
principles, and knowledge of some idiosyncratic practices that played an important role in the 
source strategy. 
The logical consequence is that heterogeneity in achieving foresight can arise at different junctures 
in the process and as a result of different processes, e.g., how first principles are used to abstract a 
theory of performance in familiar domains; how first principles are used to articulate it; how relevant 
information is gathered to assess the viability of the theory of performance in the new domain; et 
cetera. Although all of these sources of heterogeneity conceivably play a key role, what is perhaps the 
most important source of heterogeneity lies in the focal agents’ idiosyncratic baggage of 
experiences—their level of cognitive pre-adaptation, and the level of breadth and depth of experience 
in the cases that can be source of pre-adaptation. This means, we think, that an important question for 
future scholarship is about whether cognitive pre-adaptation can be viewed as a variable subject to 
manipulation, or a constraint; and if it is not only a constraint, what type of manipulation can best 
shape it. For instance, if the unit of analysis is strategic decision-making, and the level of analysis is 
the strategist or the group of strategists, it would be natural to ask if there are ways to adapt the 
boundaries and nature of the group of these individuals to the situation at hand. But the issue is 
broader and perhaps more fundamental. What constitutes a “deep experience?” Can business education 
help form it? And in all this, what is a role for business consulting?   
Let us move to the final implication. In staying with the structure of the article, it might be worth 
asking what overarching “viewpoint” this model reflects. We think the answer is that it really is the 
synthesis of the three views and associated sensibilities we considered throughout. Indeed, the model 
can be seen as a model of analogy with the addition of tight boundary conditions on what cases or 
experiences are likely to generate truly superior insight, and an explication of how discipline can be 
attained in the different phases of the analogy process. From this perspective, this is a model that 
addresses some of the issues normally associated with analogy and some of the limitations of current 
work on analogy. It can also be seen as a model of positioning, with the addition of a theoretical 
apparatus that injects disciplined creativity (where “discipline” denotes, among other things, tight 
boundary conditions on the possible sources of disciplined creativity) in a framework that lacks a 
proper treatment of the creative aspects of strategy, as some of the school’s proponents lament 
(Ghemawat and Rivkin, 2006). Finally, it can be seen as a model of cognitive pre-adaptation, with a 
shift in the locus of pre-adaptation from the firm to the individual decision maker or teams of decision-
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makers, and the injection of a theoretical apparatus that addresses the question of how a pre-adapted 
decision-maker can take her favorable position to fruition. So, we view this model as a syncretic 
artifact that takes advantage of the various sensibilities it stems from—the emphasis of representations 
of the cognitive model, the emphasis on first principles of the positioning model, and the emphasis on 
history of the evolutionary model—and, in doing so, overcomes some of their individual limitations. It 
therefore expresses a view that is at once evolutionary, cognitive, and economic. It is a model of 
evolution cum agency.  
 
The story we just presented is an anomaly. Merrill Lynch is a rare violation of the precept of 
behavioral continuity: it took a long jump that required a major shift in capabilities, routines, or 
subsystems, and it did not fall. In the parlance of our postulates, it is a violation of P4PR. Further, 
Charles Merrill had an unusual ability to anticipate the detailed components of a course of action that 
deviated significantly from the status quo. We already summarized what we view as the key insights 
and generalizations that we can draw from this “anomaly.” Let us add a broader reflection. 
We think this anomaly suggests that the concept of behavioral continuity may have more 
layers than is typically recognized. There is the layer of routines, but there is also the layer of 
cognitive representations. If routines are rightly viewed as the genetic material of organizations in 
many cases, cognitive representations may well play a functionally equivalent role in other cases. If 
preadaptation at the level of firms’ capabilities or routines is how we can explain what appear to be 
significant yet successful departures from the status quo such as Corning’s move to fiber optics, 
cognitive preadaptation can explain equally well other significant yet successful departures from the 
status quo such as Merrill Lynch’s strategic innovation.  
Consequently, the story we just presented is really not an anomaly . . . provided that we give 
behavioral continuity the broader meaning we suggest. But accepting this expansion necessarily 
translates into a more expansive evolutionary perspective on strategy, one that maintains its original 
stance on capabilities, inertia, and associated understanding of the sources of heterogeneity across 
firms, while also pursuing strategic foresight, choice, innovation, albeit within precise limits. It is a 
perspective that gives strategic agency more play but interprets it through the lenses of its commitment 
to behavioral realism and the power of history. This perspective thus holds the promise of defining a 
“behavioral center” for the strategy field that in the past has had the tendency to both balkanize around 
extreme characterizations of economic and behavioral perspectives (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2004; 
Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) and to be relatively a-historic. To conclude, the behavioral ferment that 
characterizes the recent history of the strategy field and that goes under the headings of behavioral 
strategy (Powell et al., 2011; Gavetti, 2012), micro-foundations (Felin and Foss, 2005), and attention 
	 48	
(Ocasio, 1997) is quite rich in behavioral realism at all levels of analysis, but perhaps not as rich in its 
historical sensibility. For this reason, we think it may be well served if it found in this expanded 
evolutionary sensibility a common center. 	  
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